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“WE THE JURISTS”:  ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN IRAQ 
Intisar A. Rabb∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Iraqi Constitution’s designation of Islamic law as “a source of 
law” placed the issue of Islamic law’s role in new democracies at the 
forefront of the debates on “Islamic constitutionalism.”1  Although 
the meaning of this latter phrase is itself open to debate, at a mini-
 
 ∗ Intisar A. Rabb received a J.D. from Yale Law School, an M.A. in Near Eastern Studies 
from Princeton University, and a B.S. in Arabic and Government from Georgetown Uni-
versity.  She is a 2007–2008 Prize Fellow at Princeton University’s Center for Human Val-
ues and a doctoral candidate in the University’s Department of Near Eastern Studies, 
where she is completing a dissertation on legal interpretation in American and Islamic 
law.  All translations from Arabic, Persian, and French are her own, unless otherwise 
noted.  Sincere thanks are due to James Q. Whitman, as well as Anthony T. Kronman, 
Chibli Mallat, Daniel K. Markovits, Kim Lane Scheppele, Rashid Alvi, Nusrat Choudhury, 
Monica Eppinger, and Adnan Zulfiqar for their generous feedback on this Article.  I am 
also grateful to the participants of the Comparative Constitutionalism Session at the Law 
and Society Association’s 2006 Annual Meeting, of a Session sponsored by the Princeton 
University’s Law and Public Affairs Program, and of the Religion and Public Life Seminar 
at Princeton’s Center for the Study of Religion, where versions of this paper were pre-
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 1 The constitutions of twenty-five member countries of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) incorporate some form of Islamic law:  Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Brunei, the Comoros Islands, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, 
the Maldives, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine (transitional law), Qatar, Somalia, the 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and formerly, Iraq.  For the full 
list of OIC countries, see the OIC official website, http://www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/
member_states.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).  Saudi Arabia may be counted as the 
twenty-sixth, although it has no formal constitution; its functional equivalent is a basic law 
that specifies the Qurʽān as its constitution and sharīʽa as its law.  In addition, five OIC-
member states permit courts to apply Islamic law in matters of personal status:  the Gam-
bia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, and Senegal.  Several non-OIC, non-Islamic constitu-
tional states also convene sharīʽa courts or permit their courts to apply Islamic personal 
status laws for their Muslim minority populations, for example, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, 
Israel, Kenya, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and in some cases, West-
ern countries like the United States.  See, e.g., Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-Miller, No 
Altars:  A Survey of Islamic Family Law in the United States, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS & ISLAMIC 
FAMILY LAW:  PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM 177, 188–211 (Lynn Welchman ed., 2004) (de-
scribing the application of Islamic law to marriage and divorce proceedings in the United 
States and discussing its enforceability in court). 
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mum it refers to a modern governing structure of limited powers in 
which a written constitution designates Islamic law as a source of law.2 
More than two years after its ratification, there has been little to 
no headway toward detailing the mechanisms to be employed for 
fleshing out Iraq’s constitutional skeleton.  To be sure, functioning 
political processes require domestic security—which has been lack-
ing—before the government can turn to constitutional rule-of-law 
questions under a state of non-emergency.  But after security, consti-
tutional and rule-of-law issues are the next big questions facing Iraq.  
A central component of these questions concerns the role of Islamic 
law. 
Existing debates over the viability of Islamic constitutionalism 
question whether a democratic state that constitutionally draws upon 
Islamic law is possible, particularly when liberal democratic and hu-
man rights norms are juxtaposed against uncompromising formula-
tions of archaic rules of Islamic law.3  Such juxtapositions are unhelp-
ful.  A conception of Islamic law as a monolithic body of religio-
ethical rules removed from the legal interpretive process precludes a 
discussion of the real issues at stake in Islamic constitutionalism4:  
 
 2 Constitutional law scholars differ on the definition of “constitutionalism” as much as they 
differ on the precise definition of a constitution or of democracy.  Without entering these 
debates, this definition of Islamic constitutionalism draws on basic conceptions of “consti-
tution” and couples them with Islamic law incorporation. 
 3 See, e.g., Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?:  Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 3 
NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 4, ¶ 2 (2005), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
journals/jihr/v3/4/travis.pdf (arguing that Islamic constitutionalism is inherently un-
democratic and that by incorporating Islamic law into their constitutions, Iraq and Af-
ghanistan “may become enduring and universally recognized Islamic fundamentalist 
states” that will violate women’s rights and end driving privileges in particular). 
 4 The earliest treatments of Islamic law in Western literature, such as those by I. Goldziher 
(in the 1880s and 1890s), G.H. Bousquet (in the 1940s), and J. Schacht (in the 1950s), 
define Islamic law as sacred ritual law different from the definition of law in the sense of 
Western positive law.  See, e.g., BABER JOHANSEN, Muslim Fiqh as a Sacred Law:  Religion, 
Law and Ethics in a Normative System, in CONTINGENCY IN A SACRED LAW:  LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL NORMS IN THE MUSLIM FIQH 1, 44–56 (1999).  Max Weber adopted those views in 
his analysis of Islamic law as “procedurally irrational” religious law, which is largely ho-
mogenous, has no practical relevance outside of liturgical acts and personal status, and 
which therefore does not constitute a proper subject for comparison to Western legal sys-
tems.  Id. at 48–51.  More recently, scholars of Islamic law in the humanities, drawing on 
primary Islamic legal sources, have revised this view as they discover complexities in Is-
lamic law and jurisprudence.  Developments in the legal academy in comparative legal 
scholarship have been slower; Weber’s formulation persists likely because of the hereto-
fore inaccessibility of many primary sources for Islamic law and the dearth of studies that 
draw upon them in the secondary literature.  For a thoughtful treatment of comparative 
legal studies that attempts to move beyond Weberian categories for Islamic and other 
non-Western legal systems, see generally H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE 
WORLD (2004).  For a critique of “ahistoricist jurisprudence” of Islamic law that conceives 
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modes of legitimate and authoritative interpretation and possibilities 
for laws that forward rule-of-law values and that can resolve potential 
tensions between democratic and religious accomodation concerns. 
More specifically, the central questions that Islamic constitutional-
ism evokes in the context of lawmaking and adjudication concern 
how to interpret Islamic legal texts within the particular governmen-
tal arrangement outlined by the constitution and executed by institu-
tional actors.  In other words, how is law determined in light of both 
structural considerations (which institutional bodies legitimately leg-
islate or adjudicate) and methodological ones (which legal processes 
can legislators and adjudicators legitimately employ)?5  What does the 
incorporation of Islamic law into the constitutional scheme add to 
that dynamic?  In addressing these questions with respect to Iraq’s 
emerging form of Islamic constitutionalism, this Article will consider 
the role of Islamic law as it relates to popular sovereignty (“We the 
People”) and juristic input (“We the Jurists”)6 in the legal process.  It 
does so with respect to Islamic theories of governance and in com-
parative constitutional perspective by analyzing how existing constitu-
tional states have negotiated interpretive processes under the aegis of 
Islamic constitutionalism. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts, each examining one of four 
central questions concerning Islamic law’s role in governmental and 
 
of the law as a monolith detached from historical circumstances, see Anver M. Emon, The 
Limits of Constitutionalism in the Muslim World:  History and Identity in Islamic Law, 4–5, 35–
36 & n.10 (N.Y. Law Sch. Islamic Law & Law of Muslim World, Working Paper No. 08-09, 
n.d.), available at http://www.ssrn.com/paper=1086767. 
 5 By legitimacy or validity, I refer to the legal positivist’s “rule of recognition” as articulated 
by H.L.A. Hart, for the notion of the legal sources and process of interpretation that par-
ticipants and actors in any legal regime recognize as authoritative and valid, and there-
fore legitimate.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 100–10 (2d ed. 1994). 
 6 Throughout this Article, I use “jurist” to refer to an expert of Islamic law who has com-
pleted a program of legal training through which he or she gains the authority to inter-
pret Islamic legal sources and issue legal opinions.  Historically, jurists derived authority 
not through state appointments, but through legal acumen as recognized in scholarly cir-
cles as well as amongst the populace who follow their edicts.  Juristic formulations of the 
law issue through formal judicial decisions, extra-judicial legal opinions, and expositions 
of the law in legal treatises.  Without delving into the various differences between types 
and ranks of jurists, my usage of the term encompasses scholars who fall under several 
headings in Arabic-Islamic legal terminology:  faqīh (legal specialist, also jurist), ‘ālim 
(scholar), muftī (jurisconsult), uṣūlī or mujtahid (jurist or jurisprudential specialist), or 
marja‛ (exemplar).  Historically, any one of these individuals, or perhaps a lesser-ranked 
“lawyer,” could serve as a state-appointed judge (qāḍī), who typically consulted with a ju-
rist (if he was not himself a skilled jurist) on difficult questions of law.  For different rank-
ings of jurists, see WAEL B. HALLAQ, AUTHORITY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC LAW 
1–23 (2001). 
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legal processes in an Islamic constitutional regime:  (1) How much 
consideration does the constitutional text afford Islamic law? (scope 
of Islamic legal consideration); (2) What is the content of Islamic 
law? (nature and substance of Islamic law); (3) Who decides? (institu-
tional decision-makers); and (4) How? (case study of recent Moroc-
can Islamic family law reforms). 
Thus, Part I examines the text of the new Iraqi Constitution, de-
scribing the way in which it incorporates Islamic law, human rights, 
and democratic norms.  To better understand the form of Islamic 
law-incorporation specific to Iraq, I compare the Islamic law provi-
sions of the country’s new Constitution (ratified in 2005) to its Tran-
sitional one, as well as to other incorporations of Islamic law in other 
countries in the region.  This survey reveals that the constitutional 
drafters reinstated a type of Islamic constitutionalism that centers on 
Islamic law even as they left many issues of interpretation and institu-
tional arrangement open. 
Part II discusses the nature and substance of the Islamic law that 
the Constitution seeks to incorporate into its legal scheme.  I begin 
with a description of the historical development of Islamic law, to-
gether with a discussion of its foundational sources and the interpre-
tive processes jurists use to derive substantive law.  I then apply that 
general understanding to the form that Islamic law adopts in modern 
state-institutional contexts, each of which involves questions of 
whether and how Islamic law is codified.  In that regard, I review the 
heated debate in Iraq that arose regarding whether to keep Islamic 
family law codified (as in pre-Saddam Iraq) or to replace it with un-
codified laws (in line with a proposal from post-Saddam Iraq). 
Part III examines theoretical and descriptive models of Islamic 
constitutionalism in order to assess the roles that jurists can or do 
play in the legal process around issues of interpretation.  Arguably, 
jurists—as the historical interpreters of Islamic law—act as a Fourth 
Branch7 to traditional government’s three branches, particularly 
where the latter permits jurists to play a formal institutional role.  In 
the process of negotiating the relationship between the two, it is here 
that tensions between modern liberal democratic sensibilities and 
traditional Islamic legal norms may play out.  In the interpretive 
 
 7 Note that this conception of the “Fourth Branch” does not suggest a formal branch of 
government.  Rather, the reference is to a non-government entity that influences the con-
stitutionally defined legislative, executive, and judicial branches.  In America, the Fourth 
Branch has been used foremost to refer to the media. 
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process, who makes the ultimate decision:  “We the People” or “We 
the Jurists”? 
Analyzing existing practices, I distinguish between three different 
types of constitutionalization of Islamic law:  dominant constitutionaliza-
tion—where a constitution explicitly incorporates Islamic law as the 
supreme law of the land; delegate constitutionalization—where a consti-
tution incorporates Islamic law but delegates its articulation to the ju-
rists; and coordinate constitutionalization—where a constitution incor-
porates Islamic law, laws of democratic processes, and liberal norms, 
placing them all on equal footing.  Iran is an example of the first, 
where jurists effectively control the government and all interpretive 
legal decisions; Gulf Arab states are an example of the second, where 
interpretive authority over Islamic family law in particular is vested in 
the juristic classes; and Egypt and Morocco are examples of the third, 
where the government and interpretive decision makers have devised 
schemes of differing relationships with the jurists.  I conclude with 
the observation that coordinate constitutionalization appears both to 
be the closest fit to Iraq’s skeletal constitutional scheme and to have 
the best institutional potential for yielding positive legal outcomes in 
that context. 
Part IV examines with more detail how interpretation occurs in a 
system of coordinate constitutionalization through the lens of recent 
Moroccan reforms to Islamic family law.  Arguably, Morocco presents 
a useful model for conceptualizing legislative debates that will no 
doubt arise in Iraq because, descriptively, both systems fall under the 
rubric of coordinate Islamic constitutionalization; the juristic classes 
who make up the “Fourth Branch” are strong in both systems; and 
normatively, the Moroccan reforms have been lauded domestically 
and internationally as a successful, self-conscious attempt to harmo-
nize Islamic law with democratic and human rights norms. 
*  *  * 
Before proceeding to the main body of this Article, it is worth ex-
plaining the focus on family law in the case studies herein.  Oddly 
enough, discussions of Islamic law and constitutionalism often re-
volve around questions of personal status.  This focus is odd for stu-
dents of American law because in the American context, family law is 
marginal to constitutional legal theory unless it invokes significant 
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questions of privacy rights.8  It is also odd for students of Islamic law, 
because while family law fills a major chapter in classical treatises on 
Islamic law, it has not been considered “constitutional” in the sense 
of forming one of the issues central to Islamic legal theory. 
Yet, the centrality of family law in modern discussions of Islamic 
constitutionalism has an historical explanation.  With the rise of the 
independent nation-state in the Muslim world, in many countries an 
Islamic legal order was replaced by hybrid legal systems:  mixtures of 
French or British codes,9 classical Islamic substantive law,10 and tradi-
 
 8 The most prominent examples of this are the debates over reproductive rights, sodomy 
laws, civil unions, and gay marriages.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 
(2003) (invoking liberty and privacy interests as a basis for invalidating the Texas Homo-
sexual Conduct Act); id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (applying an equal protection 
analysis); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–54 (1973) (recognizing a constitutional privacy 
interest in a woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance:  Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Iden-
tity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004) (describing Lawrence as limited judicial activism 
that referees the divisive debate over identity politics).  For an informative comparison of 
privacy in American and Islamic law, see generally Seema Saifee, Penumbras, Privacy and 
the Death of Morals-Based Legislation:  Comparing U.S. Constitutional Law with the Inherent Right 
of Privacy in Islamic Jurisprudence, 27 FORDHAM J. INT’L L. 370 (2003). 
 9 In line with their former colonial powers, most Arab countries adopted French codes, 
and Asian countries like Pakistan and Indonesia drew upon British codes.  The seat of the 
Ottoman Empire (present-day Turkey), which was not colonized, drew upon Swiss codes.  
The history of colonialism and power differentials raise the question whether the result-
ing hybrid systems were externally imposed or freely adopted—an issue that resonates 
with the situation in present-day Iraq.  See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.  Con-
stitutional scholars focusing on the Middle East have argued that the answer is some-
where between the two.  In their view, legal reformers from the Muslim world exercised 
legal agency in an attempt to preserve parts of Islamic law in the face of the inevitable 
dominance of Western codes accompanying domestic and transnational demands for le-
gal adaptation in the colonial and post-colonial periods.  E.g., NATHAN J. BROWN, THE 
RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD:  COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF (1997).  For example, 
Egyptian lawyer ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī, who was trained in France and Egypt, was in-
strumental to the codification endeavor for the Arab world; he formulated hybrid codes 
for Egypt, Iraq, and Kuwait.  Id. at 149–50.  For his views on comparative law and the new 
civil codes, see generally ‘ABD AL-RAZZĀQ AL-SANHŪRĪ, MAṢĀDIR AL-ḤAQQ FĪ AL-FIQH AL-
ISLĀMĪ:  DIRĀSA MUQĀRANA BI-AL-FIQH AL-GHARBĪ [SOURCES OF [CONTRACTUAL] RIGHTS IN 
ISLAMIC LAW:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH WESTERN LAW] (1954); ‘ABD AL-RAZZĀQ AL-
SANHŪRĪ, WAJĪZ FĪ SHARḤ AL-QĀNŪN AL-MADANĪ [ABRIDGED COMMENTARY ON THE CIVIL 
CODE] (1964); see also Enid Hill, Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law:  The Place and Significance of Is-
lamic Law in the Life and Work of ‘Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 
1895–1971, 3 ARAB L.Q. 33 (1988) (describing Sanhūrī’s Islamic and comparative law re-
search and the civil codes he created using that knowledge). 
 10 Some scholars have suggested that Islamic law in hybrid form has spelled the death of 
Islamic law generally.  See, e.g., Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)Recognition:  Islamic 
Law Pedagogy in American Academia, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 789, 790 (2004) (arguing that Is-
lamic law cannot be a “foundational category for anyone attempting to understand law in 
the Islamic world” because it has been supplanted by hybrid laws); Wael B. Hallaq, Can the 
Shari’a be Restored?, in ISLAMIC LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF MODERNITY 21, 21–48 
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tional customary law.  In these countries, foreign codes usually re-
placed all aspects of civil and criminal laws except family law, which 
provided a home for Islamic and customary laws.11  Notably, this type 
of hybridity was not a ubiquitous phenomenon in the Muslim world; 
nor was Islamic law always cabined in a family law shelter.12  As such, it 
would be a mistake to limit analyses of Islamic constitutionalism to 
family law.  To do so would leave us ill-equipped to deal with Islamic 
 
(Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & Barbara Freyer Stowasser eds., 2004) (discussing Islamic law 
as a dead legal tradition with the advent of codification and colonial forms of education).  
This view reflects a formalistic definition of Islamic law in its developed classical itera-
tions.  In point of fact, aside from Islamic law’s resurgence among Islamists and in mod-
ern constitutions, jurists continue to articulate the Islamic laws of private affairs (such as 
contracts and financial instruments, personal status, and ritual laws) in non-state forums, 
and adherents continue to consult them.  This arrangement is not a radical departure 
from historical practices, where jurists typically operated independently and separately 
from the state.  Moreover, Islamic legal-educational institutions through which Islamic 
law was perpetuated gained state support only well into the third or fourth century of Is-
lam’s advent.  To be sure, the colonial period did little to bolster Islamic law as the domi-
nating legal order of the Middle East; but it is unclear that it was the culprit for all de-
cline.  Already in the fourteenth century, for example, historian and sociologist Ibn 
Khaldūn commented on what he viewed as jurists’ conservative and non-modern view of 
the world, along with a general decline of Muslim scholarship.  See generally IBN KHALDŪN, 
MUQADDIMA (N.J. Dawood ed. & Franz Rosenthal trans., 1967).  By the eighteenth cen-
tury, scholars like Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī were advocating the renewal of the Islamic 
legal interpretive process (ijtihād) through the revival of Islam’s intellectual and educa-
tional systems.  See SHĀH WALĪ ALLĀH AL-DIHLAWĪ, ḤUJJAT ALLĀH AL-BĀLIGHA, translated in 
THE CONCLUSIVE ARGUMENT FROM GOD:  SHĀH WALĪ ALLĀH OF DELHI’S ḤUJJAT ALLĀH AL-
BĀLIGHA (Marcia Kristina Hermansen trans., 1996).  In any case, declaring Islamic law 
non-existent in the modern period is unhelpful as it precludes an analysis of the contin-
ued practice of Islamic law privately and in state formations, of Islamic legal elements that 
appear so prominently in hybrid systems, and of legal issues central to discussions of Is-
lamic constitutionalism. 
 11 For a description of how and why family law remained under the purview of Islamic law, 
see generally Hallaq, supra note 10, at 25. 
 12 For example, Saudi Arabia and Iran purport to rely on Islamic law as a main or exclusive 
source of law generally.  The Maldives recently reformed its criminal code based on Is-
lamic law; additionally, Northern Nigerian states have also instituted forms of an Islamic 
criminal code.  Islamic law has been continuously practiced in areas of ritual, in some as-
pects of family law, and in commercial transactions in Muslim and non-Muslim countries 
alike.  Islamic law is also said to fuel the Islamic finance industry, which has grown to be a 
near-trillion dollar industry with operations in over seventy countries, practices in major 
law firms like King & Spalding, financial products in major banks like HSBC, and mort-
gage companies like Guidance International devoted to “sharī‘a-compliant” offerings.  
See, e.g., IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1, 6 (2000) (noting 
that the new Islamic finance industry comprises several banks, mortgage companies, mu-
tual funds, securities firms, and insurance companies).  But see MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, 
ISLAMIC FINANCE:  LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PRACTICE, at xi–xii (2006) (arguing that current 
“Islamic finance” practices merely replicate conventional financial practices using pre-
modern forms of “Islamic” contracts and in doing so, exist mainly as a form of rent-
seeking legal arbitrage that diverge from the objectives of Islamic law). 
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law in other contexts and would ignore the central questions of Is-
lamic constitutionalism that touch all spheres of law:  matters of in-
terpretation vis-à-vis institutional democratic structures.  The focus on 
family law here is functional; through it, I attempt to engage in a 
meaningful comparative study of Islamic constitutional polities where 
Islamic family law represents a common denominator to assess Is-
lamic legal elements in the civil codes of Iraq and elsewhere. 
*  *  * 
I conclude that, while Iraq will chart its own path, some concep-
tual and practical frameworks—including the Moroccan experience 
with “coordinate constitutionalism”—can perhaps be instructive with 
respect to considering difficult questions raised by Islamic constitu-
tionalism in general and how they might be resolved in Iraq in par-
ticular.  In effect, the conceptual proposals in theory, and Morocco’s 
family law reforms in practice, provide examples of modes through 
which “We the People” and “We the Jurists” coordinate in the legal 
interpretive sphere for the rule of law in a constitutional scheme of 
limited government that incorporates Islamic law without allowing 
static or anti-democratic notions of that law to dominate. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION OF ISLAMIC LAW 
The Iraqi Constitution establishes a governing structure wherein 
Islamic law, democracy, and human rights norms all play a role.  This 
Part begins by outlining each type of clause.  Then, in contemplating 
the scope of legal consideration afforded Islamic law in particular, I 
offer a textual, historical, and comparative analysis of the Islamic law 
clauses.  The textual analysis examines the possible import of the 
unique words employed in the constitutional text.  The historical 
analysis highlights the differences between the current Iraqi Constitu-
tion and its predecessor—Iraq’s Transitional Administrative Law.  
The comparative analysis situates this Constitution against analogous 
clauses from other Islamic constitutions.  Together, these Parts dem-
onstrate that the Iraqi Constitution’s text incorporates Islamic law but 
leaves the details unresolved and awaiting further legislation. 
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A.  Textual Structure and Technical Terminology 
Three separate types of provisions govern the status of religion 
and Islamic law in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which establishes itself 
as the supreme law of the land.13  One set of provisions governs the 
role of religion and Islamic law directly.  A second set specifies cer-
tain rights and freedoms due to every Iraqi citizen.  A third set estab-
lishes the democratic nature of the new regime.  The main relevant 
clauses read as follows: 
Religion and Islamic Law14: 
Article 2.1.  Islam is the official religion of the state and a basic source of 
legislation.  No law can be passed that contradicts Islam’s settled [legal] 
rules [or settled Islamic (legal) rules] (thawābit aḥkām al-Islām). 
Rights and Freedoms15: 
Article 2.1(c).  No law can be passed that contradicts the rights and basic 
freedoms outlined in this constitution. 
Article 14.  Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination on the 
basis of gender, ethnicity, nationality, origin, color, religion, sect or legal 
school (madhhab), belief, opinion, or social and economic status. 
 
 13 2005 Al-Dustūr al-‘Irāqī [Constitution] art. 13 (Iraq) (“This Constitution shall be the su-
preme and highest law in Iraq. . . . No law that contradicts this Constitution shall be 
passed.”).  The Constitution is in Arabic; the translations are my own. 
 14 Id. art. 2.1; see also id. art. 10, 29(a).  In addition to Article 2.1, other provisions that com-
mit the state to protecting religious sites and values include Article 10 (stipulating that 
the “holy shrines and religious sites in Iraq are religious and cultural entities . . . [that] 
the state is committed to maintain and protect . . . [while] ensur[ing] the practice of reli-
gious rights freely within them”) and Article 29(a) (noting that the state will preserve the 
centrality of the family as a “religious” value). 
 15 Like the United States, Iraq’s “Bill of Rights” is spread over several constitutional provi-
sions.  For an overview, see the following provisions:  Article 2.2 (religious freedom), Arti-
cles 14 and 16 (equal protection), Article 15 (right to life), Article 17.1 (privacy), Article 
20 (political participation), Article 37 (personal freedom and dignity), Article 41 (free-
dom of religion), Article 42 (freedom of belief), and Article 44 (provisions of interna-
tional human rights treaties to which Iraq is a signatory so long as they do not conflict 
with the Constitution).  Other scattered rights-provisions include Article 22.1 (work for 
all that guarantees a good life), Article 29.4 (non-violence), Article 30 (social and health 
insurance), and Article 34.2 (free education).  Finally, Article 2.1(c) sets forth a non-
contradiction clause for constitutional rights generally.   
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Democratic Process and Rule of Law16: 
Article 2.1(b).  No law can be passed that contradicts the principles of 
democracy. 
Article 5.  The law is sovereign and the people are the sources of power 
and its legitimacy. 
*  *  * 
Read together, the two clauses on “Islam” and “settled Islamic (le-
gal) rules” in Article 2 incorporate Islamic law rather than Islam it-
self.  The constitutional text indicates that this is the case in two 
ways—through one negative implication and one positive one.  First, 
“Islam” is too vague a notion to serve as a source of legislation be-
cause the term connotes a vast religious tradition with a considerable 
amount of internal diversity.17  As a religion, Islam refers to a belief 
system that in its simplest form entails three core tenets—belief in 
 
 16 Several democratic procedural norms outline certain institutional structures, provisions 
for popular sovereignty, and federalism-limiting principles (an especially central and con-
troversial issue in the new Iraq).  Provisions establishing institutional structures and 
norms include the following:  separation of powers (Article 47), an independent judiciary 
and independent judges (Article 19 and Article 88), and a bar on private or exceptional 
courts (Article 95).  Popular sovereignty provisions include a non-contradiction clause for 
the “principles of democracy” (Article 2.1(b)), that the rule of law extends from “the 
People” (Article 5), and that laws and judicial rulings will issue in the name of “the Peo-
ple” (Article 128).  A federalism clause states that regional constitutions cannot contra-
dict the Federal Constitution (Article 120). 
 17 Muslim jurists tended to adopt a nomocentric view of religion, detailing legal and advi-
sory-ethical rules for all manner of factual and legal topics in their attempts to reduce ab-
stract moral precepts and divine commands to concrete rules in a public setting requiring 
order and rule of law.  See, e.g., Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, Introduction to MUḤAMMAD BĀQIR 
AṢ-ṢADR, DURŪS FĪ ‛ILM AL-UṢŪL [LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE] 19 (Roy Parviz Mot-
tahedeh trans., 2003) (describing how the Mu‘tazilite tradition associated with Basran 
‘Abū l-Hudhayl divided religious edicts into two categories:  those determinable by intel-
lect, and those determinable only by revelation); see also BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF 
ISLAMIC LAW 145–71 (1998) (examining Islamic law’s multiple ethico-legal injunctions 
and its moralistic bent).  To be sure, Islamic legal theory distinguished between issues of 
law, which were proper subjects for juristic expositions, and issues of fact, which were not.  
But in practice, the lines between the two were often blurred.  See Sherman A. Jackson, 
Shari’ah, Democracy, and the Modern Nation-State:  Some Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule, and 
Pluralism, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 88, 94–101 & nn.21–23 (2004) (citing IBN AL-QAṢṢĀR, 
AL-MUQADDIMA FĪ UṢŪL AL-FIQH [INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL THEORY] (Beirut:  Dār al-
Gharb al-Islāmī 1996); SHIHĀB AL-DĪN AL-QARĀFĪI, 1 AL-FURŪQ, ANWĀR AL-BURŪQ FĪ ANWĀ’ 
AL-FURŪQ 11 (Beirut:  ‛Ālam al-Kitāb n.d.)); cf. ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH, REASON, FREEDOM, 
AND DEMOCRACY IN ISLAM:  ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH 133–34 (Mah-
moud Sadri & Ahmad Sadri trans., 2000) (critiquing expansive legalistic notions of Islam 
and juristic failures to harmonize religious concerns with justice and law’s particularistic 
rules, and noting therefore that “religious law [shari’ah] is not synonymous with the en-
tirety of religion” (alteration in original)). 
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God, belief in the Prophet, and belief in the day of resurrection18—
and encourages the establishment of a just order.19 
The religion can therefore provide little legislative guidance, 
unless the Constitution contemplates legislative regulations on belief.  
It does not.  The Constitution provides for freedom of religion and 
belief in both inter- and intra-religious terms.  Perhaps foreshadow-
ing the sectarian strife that now threatens the very viability of the 
Iraqi state, the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
religion or belief with respect to the many factions into which Iraqis 
may divide:  religious, sectarian, or with regard to legal school 
(madhhab), belief, or opinion.20  It further prohibits groups and even 
tendencies that advocate accusing Muslims of infidelity to the faith.21  
The negative implication is that Islamic law, rather than Islam, is what 
the Constitution invokes as a basis for legislation. 
 
 18 All mainstream Islamic sects, both Sunnī and Shī‛ī, agree on these tenets, though they 
differ significantly in other ways theologically.  See, e.g., ABŪ ḤĀMID AL-GHAZĀLĪ, FAYṢAL AL-
TAFRIQA BAYNA AL-ISLĀM WA AL-ZANDAQA [THE DECISIVE CRITERION FOR DISTINGUISHING 
ISLAM FROM MASKED INFIDELITY] (1901), translated in ON THE BOUNDARIES OF 
THEOLOGICAL TOLERANCE IN ISLAM:  ABŪ ḤĀMID AL-GHAZĀLĪ’S Fayṣal al-tafriqa Bayna al-
Islām wa al-Zandaqa 85 (Sherman A. Jackson trans., 2002); MUḤAMMAD BĀQIR AL-ṢADR, AL-
MŪJAZ FĪ UṢŪL AL-DĪN:  AL-MURSIL, AL-RASŪL, AL-RISĀLA [ABRIDGEMENT OF THEOLOGICAL 
PRINCIPLES:  GOD, THE MESSENGER, THE MESSAGE] (‛Abd al-Jabbār al-Rifā‛ī ed. 2000). 
 19 See, e.g., QUR‛ĀN 16:90 (commanding justice, good works, and avoidance of evil deeds); 
id. 4:135 (commanding believers to stand up for justice, even if it be against their own 
selves and families); id. 5:8 (similar); id. 7:29 (stating that God commands justice); id. 
57:25 (reflecting on how messengers were sent to instruct humans to establish justice). 
 20 2005 Al-Dustūr al-‘Irāqī [Constitution] art. 14 (Iraq) (“Iraqis are equal before the law 
without discrimination on the basis of sex, ethnicity, nationality, origin, color, religion, 
sect, belief, opinion, or social and economic status.”); id. art. 42 (“Every individual has the 
freedom of conscience and belief.”); id. art. 43 (“The followers of every religion and sect 
are free in the practice of their religious rites, including [Shī‛ī] Ḥusayniyya rites [and] the 
administration of religious endowments and associated affairs as well as religious institu-
tions . . . . The state guarantees freedom of worship and the protection of [holy] sites.”). 
 21 Id. art. 7 (“Entities or trends that advocate, instigate, justify or propagate racism, terror-
ism, takfīr (declaring a Muslim to be an unbeliever or apostate), [or] sectarian cleansing, 
are banned . . . .”).  As recent trends of bloodshed have shown, the specter of sectarian 
vigilantism makes the practice of takfīr especially dangerous amongst “Wahhābīs” or “neo-
salafīs” in the mold of Ayman al-Zawahiri or Osama bin Laden, who believe that apos-
tasy—and the permissibility or even obligation of death for apostates—results from nu-
merous mundane activities that were historically acceptable in mainstream Islamic tradi-
tion.  See, for example, the list of ten acts by which a person can be considered a 
disbeliever first announced by Muḥammad b. ’Abd al-Wahhāb (eponym of the Wahhābī 
school) in the late-eighteenth century and updated by one of the foremost thinkers of 
Salafī-Wahhābī thought in the late-twentieth century, the late ‘ABD AL-‘AZ ĪZ IBN BĀZ, MIN 
FATĀWĀ WA-RASĀ’IL IBN BĀZ [THE LEGAL RULINGS AND OTHER TRACTS BY IBN BĀZ] 2, 102–
05 (1988), translated in DEFINING ISLAM:  A CRITICAL READER § 1 (Andrew Rippin ed., 
2007). 
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Second, and more pointedly, is the positive implication of the 
non-contradiction clause in its use of two terms that connote law:  
“thawābit” and “aḥkām.”  Thawābit (singular thābit) is discussed in clas-
sical works, but does not play a rule of central importance in articula-
tions of legal theory.  With its appearance in modern documents of 
law and state, contemporary jurists have revisited the term, attempt-
ing to link it to the classical tradition.  For example, the head muftī of 
Egypt, ‘Alī Jumu‛a, explains that thawābit are agreed-upon Islamic le-
gal rules that apply to all Muslims, regardless of time or place.22  
Aḥkām typically refers to legal rules in both classical and modern us-
age.23  Together, these two terms affirmatively indicate that the Iraqi 
Constitution has incorporated Islamic law—rather than the religion 
of Islam. 
 
 22 Jumu‛a compares thawābit to the classical category of unchanging rules that enjoy legal 
consensus (al-mujma‛ ‛alayh), which include personal status laws.  ‛Alī Jumu‛a, Al-Thābit 
wa-l-Mutaghayyir fī al-Sharī‘a al-Islāmiyya [The Permanent and Impermanent in Islamic Law], 7 
AL-MANĀR AL-JADĪD [NEW MINARET] 45–46 (1999).  His discussion has been artfully dis-
cussed by Kristen A. Stilt in Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal Sys-
tem, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 695, 744 (2004).  She notes that, contrary to Jumu‛a’s 
opinion, “[t]here is no clear sense in Islamic jurisprudence that the thawābit refer to a 
fixed and widely known list of rules or principles . . . .”  Id. at 744.  Indeed, Muḥammad 
Bāqir al-Ṣadr explicitly notes that even “Islamic legal rules . . . [that are] thābit (settled) 
can change in application, depending on contingencies that may change from time to 
time.”  MUḤAMMAD BĀQIR AL-ṢADR, AL-FATĀWĀ AL-WĀḌIḤAH WAFQAN LI-MADHHAB AHL AL-
BAYT [CLEAR LEGAL OPINIONS ACCORDING TO SHĪ‛Ī LAW] 13 (1977). 
 23 Descriptively, “ḥukm” (the singular of aḥkām) refers to the logical relationship between 
two objects, see 1 MUḤAMMAD ‘ALĪ AL-TAHĀNAWĪ, KASHSHĀF ISTILĀḤĀT AL-FUNŪN WA AL-
‛ULŪM 693–95, 700 (Beirut 1996), but prescriptively, it is a theological/legal rule that re-
sults from a command, id.; see also MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC 
JURISPRUDENCE 140–43 (rev. ed. 1991) (explaining how rules develop from religious 
commands).  Jurisprudence adopts logic’s descriptive sense when describing the obliga-
tions or status relationships that result from certain legal acts (aḥkām waḍ‛iyya [declara-
tory rulings]), like the validity of a contract; it adopts theology’s prescriptive sense when 
considering the implications of divine commands for human obligations (aḥkām taklīfiyya 
[injunctive rulings]), like the obligation to pay a poor-tax on wealth.  Jurists define it as 
follows:  a ḥukm is a legal rule regulating human behavior as a consequence of a divine 
command.  See WAHBA AL-ZUḤAYLĪ, Al-Wasīṭ fī uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī [Compendium on Islamic 
Jurisprudence] 34 & n.1 (1965) (defining ḥukm as “God’s divine-law articulation associated 
with the actions of legal-agents” and citing an identical definition in the works of several 
jurisprudential specialists).  In judicial institutions—both classical and modern—a ḥukm is 
a legally binding court judgment, which is distinguished from the opinions (fatwās) is-
sued by muftīs that have only advisory force.  See SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND 
THE STATE:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHĀB AL-DĪN AL-QARĀFI 116, 148 
(1996) (clarifying the prescriptive nature of a ḥukm and explaining why only a ḥukm is 
binding). 
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B.  In Historical Perspective 
The import of the Islamic law clauses here were further consid-
ered in light of analogous clauses in Iraq’s Transitional Constitution.  
The new Constitution differs from the Transitional one in two signifi-
cant ways.  First, the new Constitution replaced the clause stipulating 
that “Islam . . . is to be considered a source of legislation (maṣdar li-al-
tashrī‛)”24 with the clause stipulating that “Islam . . . is a basic source of 
legislation (maṣdar asās li-al-tashrī‛).”25  Dropping the words “is con-
sidered” and adding “basic” may be taken to suggest that the drafters 
of the new Constitution aimed for Islamic law to have a more central 
role in the legislative process and in judicial determinations of consti-
tutionality. 
Second, the new Constitution replaces the old clause prohibiting 
laws that contradict “the agreed-upon (through consensus), settled 
tenets of Islam (thawābit al-Islām al-mujma‛ ‛alayhā)”26 with a clause 
against laws that contradict “settled Islamic (legal) rules.”27  The first 
change, replacing “settled tenets of Islam” with “settled Islamic (le-
gal) rules,” underscores the focus on law rather than religion.  The 
second change omits “agreed-upon (through consensus),” the full 
implications of which are unclear.  Consensus forms one of the 
sources for definitive Islamic legal opinions, but historically jurists 
have rarely agreed upon the details of legal rulings.  In the absence of 
consensus, jurists were free to develop alternative interpretations ac-
cording to their legal school’s methodology for deriving legal rules.  
The product of this scheme was Islamic law’s system of legal plural-
ism:  multiple interpretations that were deemed equally valid, so long 
as they followed a valid juridical interpretive process based on au-
thentic sources.28  In this context, the phrase “agreed upon (through 
consensus)” may have closed the door on extensive juridical involve-
ment in determining the content of Iraqi state law relevant to ques-
tions of Islamic law.  For this phrase recalls terminology with estab-
lished meaning and—within those confines—would have narrowed 
the juristic sphere of input to a short list of universally agreed-upon 
 
 24 Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period [Constitution] art. 
7, Mar. 8, 2004 [hereinafter Interim Constitution], available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
government/TAL.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).   
 25 2005 Al-Dustūr al-‘Irāqī [Constitution] art. 2.1 (Iraq) (emphasis added). 
 26 Interim Constitution, supra note 24, art. 7. 
 27 2005 Al-Dustūr al-‘Irāqī [Constitution] art. 2.1 (Iraq). 
 28 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 23, at 142 (defining medieval jurist Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī’s 
concept of the rule of law as “the ability to countenance a plurality of equally authorita-
tive legal interpretations”). 
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rules.  The replacement of this phrase with a newer, more indetermi-
nate term, “settled Islamic (legal) rules,” could have the opposite ef-
fect, depending on (1) the meaning it ultimately assumes vis-à-vis the 
principle of consensus and (2) the relationship the state develops 
with the jurists.  These issues are taken up in Parts II and III, respec-
tively. 
C.  In Comparative Perspective 
The scope of consideration for Islamic law can be evaluated by 
comparing Iraq’s constitutional language with that of other Islamic 
constitutional countries.  In the twenty-six countries that incorporate 
Islamic law,29 the constitutions typically refer to “sharī‘a.”  Most refer 
to the term “Islamic sharī‘a” (Bahrain, Libya, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Yemen);30 alternative terms include “Islamic fiqh” (Syria)31 and “the 
principles of Islamic sharī‘a” (Egypt).32  Each of these formulations 
contrasts with Iraq’s use of “Islam” and “settled Islamic (legal) 
rules.”33  In addition, Islamic constitutions generally incorporate Is-
lamic law through rendering sharī‘a and its cognates “a (main) 
source” or “the source of law.”34  Iraq renders Islamic law “a basic 
source.”35 
 
 29 See supra note 1.  A minority of other constitutions use anomalous phrases that do not 
reference sharī‘a directly.  See, e.g., 2004 The Constitution of Afghanistan art. 35 (“the 
principles of the sacred religion of Islam”); 1980 Qānūn-i Asāsī-yi Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān 
[Basic Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran (as amended)] art. 4 (“Islamic criteria”); 1998 
The Constitution of the Republic of the Maldives ch. 1 § 1 (“the principles of Islam”); 
1973 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Part IX § 227 (“Injunctions of 
Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet”); ch. 3A 
§ 203D(1) (same). 
 30 2002 Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain art. 2; 1962 Kuwait Constitution art. 2; 1992 
Basic Law of Governance [Constitution] art. 7–8 (Saudi Arabia); 1969 Libya Constitution 
art. 8 (for inheritance); 1996 White Book:  The Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman 
[Constitution] art. 2; 2004 Transnational Federal Charter of the Somali Republic [Consti-
tution] art. 8 (Somalia); 2005 Constitution of the Republic of Sudan art. 5.1; 2004 Per-
manent Constitution of the State of Qatar art. 1; 1994 Constitution of the Republic of 
Yemen art. 3; 1996 United Arab Emirates Constitution art. 7; 1980 Qānūn-i Asāsī-yi Jum-
hūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān [Basic Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran (as amended)] art. 167 
(Iran).  For the full list of Islamic constitutional countries, see supra note 1. 
 31 1973 Syria Constitution art. 3. 
 32 1971 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt art. 2. 
 33 2005 Al-Dustūr al-‘Irāqī [Constitution] art. 2.1. 
 34 Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates use “a main 
source,” and Yemen and Sudan “a source;” Egypt Iran, and Somalia use “the (main) 
source” or the “basic source.”  See supra note 30. 
 35 2005 Al-Dustūr al-‘Irāqī [Constitution] art. 2.1 (Iraq). 
  
Mar. 2008] ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN IRAQ 541 
 
Iraq’s unique terminology for “Islamic law” and its avoidance of 
the term sharī‘a likely signals that Iraq aims not to mimic any existing 
form of Islamic constitutionalism.36  The precise form of Islamic con-
stitutionalism that Iraq adopts will depend upon the form that its 
government gives to the term “Islam” and to “settled Islamic (legal) 
rules.”  Nevertheless, to the extent that all types of Islamic constitu-
tionalization are characterized by a constitutional incorporation of 
Islamic law, the experiences of other Islamic constitutional countries 
in the realm of legislation and legal interpretation may prove instruc-
tive to understanding some of the issues facing Iraq. 
II.  NATURE AND SUBSTANCE OF ISLAMIC LAW 
If Iraq’s constitutional drafters aimed for Islamic law to play a cen-
tral role in Iraqi legislation, what is the Islamic law (or “settled Islamic 
(legal) rules”) that they incorporated?  Determining the substance of 
Islamic law can be a complex process because of its developmental 
history and its internal diversity.  After examining these themes to de-
velop a general definition of Islamic law in historical perspective, this 
Part considers them under the modern rubric of Islamic constitu-
tionalism.  In this context, two important issues that face Iraq are 
questions dealing with consensus and codification.  Despite the new 
Constitution’s omission of an explicit reference to consensus, what 
role does consensus play, given its central place in Islamic jurispru-
dence?  Does the phrase “settled Islamic (legal) rules” entail a con-
sensus requirement after all?  And in the modern legislative process, 
which will either codify laws or leave them open to juristic interpreta-
tion, what forms might Islamic law adopt in Iraq?  I will discuss the 
latter question in light of recent Iraqi history, in which family law has 
been prominent in the codification debate even before Saddam’s fall, 
and have continued to figure in with the advent of Islamic constitu-
tionalism. 
A.  In Historical Perspective 
Simply put, Islamic law is law that is either embodied in or derived 
from Islam’s foundational legal sources.37  There are two terms used 
 
 36 It may also mean that Iraq’s constitutional drafters deliberately recognized a difference 
between sharī‘a and fiqh.  For this difference, see infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 37 The four principal sources of law for Sunnīs include the Qur‘ān, Sunna (prophetic prac-
tice), Consensus, and Analogical Reasoning.  See, e.g., KAMALI, supra note 23, at 16–116, 
228–305; BERNARD WEISS, THE SEARCH FOR GOD’S LAW 151–258 (1992).  For Shī‛īs, they 
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to refer to Islamic law:  sharī‘a and fiqh.  Fiqh and sharī‘a often are 
used interchangeably to refer to “Islamic law,” both among modern 
and classical commentators.  The recent trend, however, is to distin-
guish between the two.38 
Sharī‘a is the divinely ordained “path,” known perfectly only by 
God.  In other words, it is God’s will expressed in the ideals of perfect 
justice and equality.  Fiqh (literally, “discernment”) is a human at-
tempt to know the sharī‘a.  The human articulation of the ideal is a 
dynamic process that must constantly be worked and reworked to ad-
dress new situations.39  Thus the law embodied in the revelatory sources 
is sharī‘a proper—God’s divine law articulated in principled terms.  
The law derived from the sources is fiqh—the human attempt to under-
stand and articulate the ideal in terms of particular circumstances of 
individual and social life. 
In sum, Islamic law refers to both the existing body of precenden-
tial substantive laws of fiqh and the processes through which jurists in-
terpret or update the law in attempts to better approximate sharī‘a.40  
This conception of Islamic law might be compared to the sense of 
“law” in American constitutional law and similar common law sys-
tems—a sometimes confusing collection of doctrines and rules, based 
on a foundational text, subject to clarification or refinement by quali-
fied jurists endowed with the authority to say what the law is.41 
 
are the Qur‘ān, Sunna (normative prophetic and imamic practice), Consensus, and Rea-
son.  See HOSSEIN MODARRESSI, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHĪ‘Ī LAW:  A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL 
STUDY 2 (1984). 
 38 See ṢUBḤĪ MAḤMAṢĀNĪ, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRĪ’ FĪ AL-ISLĀM [THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
JURISPRUDENCE IN ISLAM] 21–24, 199–200 (Farhat Ziahdeh trans. 1961); WEISS, supra note 
17, at 119–21; ABŪ ZAHRA, UṢŪL AL-FIQH 291 (Dār al-Fikr al-‛Arabī 1957); Khaled Abou El 
Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 4, 64 (2003). 
 39 Mottahedeh, supra note 17, at 17–18 (explaining the development of jurisprudence in 
Islamic law, which involves the human attempt to discern the Sharī‘a, as the path or-
dained and known only by God); see also ABOU EL FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD’S NAME 32 
(2001) (“The Sharī‛ah is God’s Will in an ideal and abstract fashion, but the fiqh is the 
product of the human attempt to understand God’s Will.  In this sense, the Sharī‛ah is al-
ways fair, just and equitable, but the fiqh is only an attempt at reaching the ideals and 
purposes of Sharī‛ah (maqāṣid al-Shar‛īah).  According to the jurists, the purpose of 
Sharī‛ah is to achieve the welfare of the people (taḥqīq maṣāliḥ al-‛ibād), and the purpose 
of fiqh is to understand and implement the Sharī‛ah.  The conceptual distinction between 
Sharī‛ah and fiqh was the product of a recognition of the inevitable failures of human ef-
forts at understanding the purposes or intentions of God.”). 
 40 For further discussion of substance and procedure in Islamic law, see Ann Elizabeth 
Mayer, The Sharī‘ah:  A Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules?, in ISLAMIC LAW AND 
JURISPRUDENCE 177–98 (Nicholas Heer ed., 1990). 
 41 This view of the juridical role is similar to Chief Justice John Marshall’s exposition of the 
judicial power “to say what the law is” in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803).  Chibli Mallat makes this point with reference to the Iranian Constitution.  See 
 
  
Mar. 2008] ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN IRAQ 543 
 
Early jurists developed a system of jurisprudence to say what the 
law is—a hermeneutical methodology for assessing and interpreting 
texts in efforts to articulate sharī‘a in terms of fiqh.  One scholar has 
explained that “it is essential for the fiqh to be known on the human 
plane as accurately as possible.”42  Thus, engaging in jurisprudential 
methods to derive the law (fiqh) requires training in both jurispru-
dence and in substantive law. 
The main features of jurisprudence used to mediate between au-
thoritative texts (or sharī‘a) and derived legal rules (fiqh) involve 
three stages.  Jurists must identify and weigh plausible foundational 
sources of law, drawing on a vast body of Qur‘ānic and ḥadīth texts as 
well as a vast body of precedential rulings from early jurists and 
community leaders.  They must also determine the authenticity of 
those sources.  While there is no doubt about the integrity and au-
thenticity of the Qur‘ānic text among jurists, there is considerable 
doubt as to the authenticity of many ḥadīths through which the Sunna 
is generally known.43  Moreover, there is disagreement about the exis-
tence of consensus—the third authoritative source of law—on all but 
a few areas of law.  There is also considerable diversity of equally au-
thoritative precedential rulings.  Finally, jurists must weigh these 
sources and precedents, attempting to arrive at a legal posture with 
respect to a particular issue at hand.  They do so by navigating a vast 
body of rules from these multitudinous, sometimes divergent, sources 
with an eye to coherence.44 
 
CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW:  MUHAMMAD BAQER AS-ṢADR, NAJAF AND 
THE SHI‛I INTERNATIONAL 79 (1993) (“[T]he quintessential constitutional question is who 
ultimately holds the power to say what the law is.  In view of the centrality of the shari‘a in 
the definition of an Islamic state, this issue represents the essential problem of contem-
porary Islamic law.”). 
 42 Mottahedeh, supra note 17, at 17–18 (describing this jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) as a 
“method of explaining texts [that] gains authority as it gains internal consistency and 
agrees with theological ideas”).  For a comparison with American ideas of legal interpre-
tation, compare citations in infra note 44. 
 43 This doubt led to the emergence of the science of ḥadīth-criticism, which aimed to distin-
guish between authentic and inauthentic reports of Sunna.  E.g., IBN AL-ṢALĀḤ, ‘ULŪM AL-
ḤADĪTH (Nūr al-Dīn ‛Iṭr ed., 1966).  That science itself has been critiqued for failing to 
adequately weed out spurious ḥadīths.  See, e.g., Johnatha Brown, Critical Rigor vs. Judicial 
Pragmatism: How Legal Theorists and Ḥadīth Scholars Approached the Backgrowth of Isnāds in the 
Genre ‛Ilal al-Ḥadīth, 14, 1 J. OF ISLAMIC LAW & SOC’Y 1 (2007). 
 44 It is in this sense that “law” here is like American constitutional interpretation.  See, e.g., 
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution in the United States:  Contemporary Ratification, in 
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE:  A HERMENEUTIC READER 13–15 (Sanford Levinson 
& Steven Mailloux eds., 1988) (noting that Supreme Court interpretations gain legiti-
macy through presenting coherent arguments according to recognized rules of interpre-
tation and that “[b]ecause judicial power resides in the authority to give meaning to the 
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The process is further complicated because of the pluralistic sys-
tem of multiple legal schools.  Over time the legal sources, the organ-
izational scheme through which jurists attempted to arrange the 
sources into a coherent legal system, and thus the sources and meth-
odologies for individual jurists’ interpretive schemes all typically have 
come to be accessed through one of Islam’s multiple legal schools.  
These schools by and large represent different means of negotiating 
the sources, as worked out by expert jurists over the centuries. 
Islamic law proceeded in stages, and grew in complexity the fur-
ther it moved from its origins.  Originally, it consisted of Qur‘ānic 
and prophetic commandments that drew upon, modified, or re-
placed existing legal conventions in the seventh-century Near East.  
Following Muḥammad’s death, four successor caliphs articulated pub-
lic law while a scholarly class, some of whom were Muḥammad’s 
Companions, some of whom were his Family members, continued 
and built upon his teachings.45  For the Sunnīs, this class perpetuated 
amongst Muḥammad’s Companions, their successors, and their col-
lective students; for the Shī‛a, this class perpetuated through the 
Prophet’s educated and pious family members (the Imāms) and their 
students.46  Records from these sessions and the informed opinions 
that individual scholars issued added to the ḥadīth corpus and helped 
define early law. 
This scholarly, early juristic activity continued throughout the 
reign of the first Umayyad dynasty (r. 661–750).  During this time and 
 
Constitution, the debate [about legitimacy] is really a debate about how to read the text, 
about constraints on what is legitimate interpretation”); Sanford Levinson, Law as Litera-
ture, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE:  A HERMENEUTIC READER, supra, at 155 (af-
firming that the judiciary must adhere to recognized rules of interpretation for legitimate 
interpretation, though noting that such rules are not uniform). 
 45 On the succession to Muḥammad as head of the Muslim community and the first four 
caliphs’ leadership activities, see generally 1 MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF 
ISLAM:  CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY IN A WORLD CIVILIZATION (1974) (standard Sunnī nar-
rative); HUGH KENNEDY, THE PROPHET AND THE AGE OF THE CALIPHATES (1986) (same); 
WILFERD MADELUNG, THE SUCCESSION TO MUḤAMMAD:  A STUDY OF THE EARLY CALIPHATE 
(1997) (alternative Shī‛ī account). 
 46 On the emergence and activities of the scholarly classes, see Etan Kohlberg, Imam and 
Community in the Pre-Ghayba Period, in BELIEF AND LAW IN IMĀMĪ SHĪ’ISM 25–53 (Etan Kohl-
berg ed., 1991).  See also HARALD MOTZKI, DIE ANFÄNGE DER ISLAMISCHEN JURISPRUDENZ. 
IHRE ENTWICKLUNG IN MEKKA BIS ZUR MITTE DES 2./8. JAHRHUNDERTS [THE ORIGINS OF 
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE:  MECCAN FIQH BEFORE THE CLASSICAL SCHOOLS] (1991) (Marion 
Katz, trans. 2001) (tracing the activities of the scholarly class in Mecca back to at least the 
year 661 when Muḥammad’s Companion Ibn ‛Abbās moved to Mecca to teach); 
MODARRESSI, supra note 37, at 29–32 (tracing the scholarly activities of the period from 
the accession of the first Imām, ‛Alī (the fourth caliph), until the occultation (ghayba) of 
the twelfth and final Imām in 874). 
  
Mar. 2008] ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN IRAQ 545 
 
through the early ‛Abbāsid dynasty (r. 750–1258), proto-schools of 
law developed—regional circles of students who self-consciously fol-
lowed a principle teacher who was an accomplished, scholarly author-
ity in their local vicinities.  The eponymous heads of today’s main 
schools mostly lived during this early period:  Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767), 
Mālik (d. 795), their student Shāfi‛ī (d. 819), Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 
855), and Ja‛far al-Ṣādiq (d. 765).47 
In the middle of the ninth century, these proto-schools developed 
into larger trends until they formed full-fledged legal schools (be-
tween the ninth and tenth centuries), with both positive legal rules 
and a particular jurisprudential methodology.  This jurisprudence in-
cluded identification and placement of sources in a certain hierarchy 
of authoritativeness and primacy, as well as methods of source-
criticism, primarily of ḥadīth works that were gathered in what came 
to be known as canonical collections.48  During this time, dozens of 
legal schools proliferated; it was only later that they coalesced around 
five major Sunnī schools (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi‛ī, Ḥanbalī, Ẓāhirī) and 
four Shī‛ī schools (Imāmī/Twelver, Ismā‛īlī/Sevener, Zaydī/Fiver and 
Ibāḍī).49  The Ẓāhirī school is said to have died in the late eleventh 
 
 47 There is a vast literature on the origins and development of Islamic law.  For an excellent, 
succinct treatment that covers both Sunnī and Shī‛ī schools, see Mottahedeh, supra note 
17. For an accessible narrative that summarizes many of the developments for Sunnī 
schools, see WAEL HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW (2005).  For 
other useful overviews of the development of main schools of Islamic law, see 
MAḤMAṢĀNĪ, supra note 38, at 42 (commenting on the periodization of Islamic law); id. at 
69–86 (discussing the Sunnī and Shī‛ī schools of law); CHRISTOPHER MELCHERT, THE 
FORMATION OF THE SUNNI SCHOOLS OF LAW, 9TH–10TH CENTURIES C.E. (1997) (summa-
rizing other Sunnī schools generally).  For more detailed school-specific studies, see gen-
erally JONATHAN BROCKOPP, EARLY MĀLIKĪ LAW:  IBN ‘ABD AL-ḤAKAM AND HIS MAJOR 
COMPENDIUM OF JURISPRUDENCE (2000) (Mālikī school); YASIN DUTTON, THE ORIGINS OF 
ISLAMIC LAW:  THE QUR’AN, THE MUWAṬṬA’, AND MADINAN ‘AMAL (1999) (same); Majid 
Khadduri, Introduction to AL-IMĀM MUḤAMMAD IBN IDRIS AL-SHĀFI’I’S, AL-RISĀLA FĪ UṢŪL AL-
FIQH [TREATISE ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE] 8–19, 21–48 (Majid 
Khadduri trans., 2d ed., Islamic Texts Society 1987) (Shāfi‛ī school).  For further discus-
sion, see WILFERD MADELUNG, RELIGIOUS TRENDS IN EARLY ISLAMIC IRAN 93–105 (1988) 
(regarding the Ismā‛īlī school); id., at 77–92 (regarding the Ibāḍi school); MODARRESSI, 
supra note 37, at 3–5 (regarding the Shī‛ī Imāmī or Twelver school). 
 48 The six Sunnī canonical ḥadīth collections are those of Bukhārī (d. 869), Muslim (d. 874), 
Abū Dāwūd (d. 886), al-Nasā’ī (d. 888), Tirmidhī (d. 892), and Ibn Mājah (d. 915).  On 
the canonical collections and works of ḥadīth-criticism in the Sunnī context, see KAMALI, 
supra note 23, at 87–92, and JONATHAN BROWN, THE CANONIZATION OF BUKHĀRĪ AND 
MUSLIM:  THE FORMATION AND FUNCTION OF THE SUNNĪ ḤADĪTH TRADITION (2007).  The 
four Shī‛ī canonical ḥadīth collections are those of Kulaynī (d. 941), Ibn Bābawayh (d. 
991–2), and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067) (two books).  For further discussion, see 
MODARRESSI, supra note 37, at 3–5. 
 49 On the proliferation and dissipation of the personal schools, see GEORGE MAKDISI, THE 
RISE OF COLLEGES:  INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING IN ISLAM AND THE WEST 2–4 (1981), which 
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century with the death of its most prolific scholar, Ibn Ḥazm in 1082, 
though there are indications that it still has followers in the modern 
day.  Today, laws from each of these major schools are in force some-
where in the Muslim world or in countries with large Muslim minori-
ties.50  
The rulings of each legal school not only represent the fruits of 
source-critical methods to address issues of textual authenticity and 
reliability, but also have gained a large measure of precedential value 
in both popular and juristic arenas.  Popularly, Muslims tend to fol-
low a particular school of law and look to jurists for expositions of 
that school’s commands and prohibitions.  For their part, jurists re-
ceive training in substantive laws and interpretive methodologies of a 
particular legal school, which equips them with the ability to issue rul-
ings that are faithful to a certain school and/or its adherents, and 
that cover contemporary circumstances. 
Even expert jurists who formally have attained a certain rank that 
qualifies them to reformulate rules outside the context of any legal 
school are bound by precedent.51  If such jurists attempt to accom-
modate modern sensibilities, they must contend with traditional views 
embodied in the received body of precedents as well as the very na-
ture and organization of the legal debates.  In this regard, a legal 
treatise by the late Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, who is recognized as 
having achieved the rank of expert jurist, is interesting.52 
In the introduction to his work, Ṣadr criticizes his fellow jurists for 
an over-reliance on the form for organizing and addressing legal is-
sues bequeathed by tradition.  In his view, most treatises are badly 
written because they slavishly adhere to classical schemes of topical 
organization and employ excessively technical language.53  This way of 
 
notes that there were 500 proto-Sunnī personal schools, most of which slowly died out by 
the ninth century. 
 50 For a breakdown of the geographical distributions, see Norman Calder et al., Law, in OX-
FORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD (forthcoming), available at 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0473#e0473-s0002. 
 51 “Expert jurist” here refers to mujtahid or mujtahid muṭlaq, and is used to distinguish the 
highest ranks of jurists that the Islamic legal tradition formally identifies.  For the grades 
of juristic expertise and descriptions of the qualifications necessary to reach the highest 
level of jurist (mujtahid muṭlaq), see generally HALLAQ, supra note 6. 
 52 See ṢADR, supra note 22.  For his biography, see Mottahedeh, supra note 17, at 28–33. 
 53 See ṢADR, supra note 22, at 48–53.  Classical fiqh works generally were divided into four 
major categories:  ritual law (‛ibādāt), commercial transactions or “worldly affairs” 
(mu‛āmalāt), personal status law (munākiḥāt, or in modern terms, al-aḥwāl al-shakhṣiyya or 
qānūn al-‛ā’ila), and criminal and tort law (ḥudūd, ‛uqūbāt or jināyāt).  Other sections in-
cluded civil and criminal procedure (mukhāṣamāt or qaḍā’), public international law (si-
yar), and “constitutional,” administrative, and tax law (al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya).  For more 
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proceeding is problematic because it is far removed from the realities 
and grammar of today’s average reader; it also results in the omission 
of certain modern issues altogether simply because many contempo-
rary discussions were never brought up in classical fiqh books.54  Ṣadr 
departs from the classical formulation to some extent by recategoriz-
ing the major sections of Islamic law55 and presenting general princi-
ples at the start of each chapter, upon which he then expounds with 
specific examples that include modern considerations in simple lan-
guage.56  But the extent of his departure is limited.57  Reform-minded 
jurists like Ṣadr must always grapple with the weight of precedent in 
attempting to replace it with their own formulations.  This requires 
convincing arguments as to why new formulations should replace set-
tled rules.  Advancing such arguments is an ongoing process amongst 
similarly minded jurists. 
In Iraq, the complex structure of Islamic law is further compli-
cated by the presence of and differences between the Sunnī and Shī‛ī 
schools of law.  Iraq’s Muslim population is majority Shī‛ī with a 
Sunnī, mostly Ḥanafī, minority.  Aside from the Qur‛ān and a few 
well-known practices, Shī‛ī and Sunnī law recognize somewhat differ-
ent bodies of authoritative legal sources.58  These differences notwith-
standing, the major legal rules in the two schools are similar enough 
in their broad contours, but can differ significantly in the detailed 
rules in certain areas—such as matters of personal status.59 
 
detailed discussions of these and additional categories, see MAḤMAṢĀNĪ, supra note 38, at 
24–25 (Sunnī law) and MODARRESSI, supra note 37, especially at chapter 3 (Shī‛ī law). 
 54 See ṢADR, supra note 22, at 49–50. 
 55 His categories include ritual law (al-‛ibādāt), commercial and property law (al-amwāl), pri-
vate/civil actions (al-sulūk al-khāṣṣ), and public law (al-sulūk al-‛āmm).  See id. at 54–57.  
Compare these categories to those of the classical formation, supra note 53. 
 56 E.g., ṢADR, supra note 22, at 111 (discussing “Islamic” versus scientific determinations of 
the Islamic calendar, which is central to, inter alia, the debate over whether the new lunar 
month begins with the sighting of the moon or by astronomical calculations). 
 57 See, e.g., id. at 221–22 (the impurity of non-Muslims).  Unfortunately, Ṣadr was executed 
before he got beyond the first book, which was on ritual law.  His treatment of social is-
sues and public law would have been much more telling. 
 58 See supra note 37. 
 59 See, e.g., Etan Kohlberg, Evolution of the Shī‛a, in E. KOHLBERG, BELIEF AND LAW IN IMĀMĪ 
SHĪ’ISM 1 (1991) (Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot ed., 1979) (noting major differences in per-
sonal status law); Wilferd Madelung, Shī’ī Attitudes Toward Women as Reflected in Fiqh, in 
SOCIETY AND THE SEXES IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM 69 (Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot ed., 1979) 
(same). 
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B.  In the Context of Islamic Constitutionalism 
By using the ambiguous phrase “settled Islamic (legal) rules,” 
Iraq’s constitutional drafters delegated key questions about the form 
that the law will assume to later decision makers.  Specifically, they 
left it for others to clarify whether “settled Islamic (legal) rules” 
equals absolute consensus, whether they intended for that consensus 
to arise amongst jurists or elected politicians, and whether the “set-
tled” rules should be codified. 
1.  Consensus 
As noted, the new Iraqi Constitution’s omission of “agreed upon 
(through consensus)” from the incorporation of “settled Islamic (le-
gal) rules” may mean that Iraqi judges or jurists are not limited to 
operating solely within the confines of past juridical consensus but 
may exercise some amount of discretion in saying what the law is with 
respect to a number of factors relevant in the present day.60  Despite 
the omission of the term “consensus,” questions closely relevant to it 
will still arise for at least two reasons.  First, as noted, consensus con-
stitutes one of the four sources of Islamic law for both Sunnī and 
Shī‛ī Schools.61  Second, classical discussions of Islamic political the-
ory list the application of Islam’s clear legal rules—including those 
subject to consensus—as one of the Islamic head-of-state’s core obli-
gations.62  The difficulty with this doctrine in the context of Islamic 
constitutionalism enters in the determination of whether consensus 
has been reached on particular areas and how this relates to the head 
of a democratic constitutional state merely concerned with but not 
compelled by Islamic law.63 
 
 60 Lisa Hajjar mentions some of those factors:  variations in Islamic legal interpretation that 
reflect the lack of broad consensus in the Muslim community, the relationship between 
religious law and state power (i.e., the question posed by Islamic constitutionalism), and 
“the influence of trans-national discourses and movements,” especially in “Islamization” 
and human rights initiatives.  Lisa Hajjar, Domestic Violence and Sharī’a:  A Comparative Study 
of Muslim Societies in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS & ISLAMIC FAMILY 
LAW:  PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM 237–38 (Lynn Welchman ed., 2004). 
 61 See supra note 37. 
 62 E.g., IMĀM AL-ḤARAMAYN AL-JUWAYNĪ, GHIYĀTH AL-UMAM FĪ ILTIYĀTH AL-ẒULAM 17, 46–47 
(Dār al-Da‘wah 1979) (explaining that clear Islamic rules or “legal certainties” (qawāṭi‛ al-
shar‛) encompass three categories:  (1) clear scriptural text that needs no interpretation, 
(2) reports so widespread that there is no possibility of corrupted transmission and no 
doubt as to their origin, and (3) settled consensus (ijmā’ mun‛aqad)). 
 63 Scholars debate whether universal consensus could exist on any but a few fundamentals.  
Amongst Sunnīs, consensus originally referred to the agreement of a few scholars in a 
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As a practical matter, the indefinite status of consensus or “settled 
Islamic (legal) rules” leaves open the question of which, if any, con-
tested rules warrant legal cognizance under Iraq’s formulation of its 
Islamic constitutional scheme.  On the one hand, if the state chooses 
to adopt the majority opinions of just one of the several legal schools, 
predictability of the law would no doubt increase, at the expense of 
representative democracy and protections for minority sects.  Such a 
scheme would require a coherent justification for privileging one le-
gal school amongst a populace that affiliates with multiple (equally 
valid) legal and sectarian identities.64  Recent history has illustrated 
the difficulty, if not impossibility, of such a task.  Iraq’s first family law 
code, which was drafted in 1953 by Egyptian legal reformer Sanhūrī 
and which privileged Ḥanafī law, led to massive opposition on the 
part of the Shī‛ī jurists.  This strategy of privileging the rules of a sin-
gle legal school appears to be a purely modern consequence of state-
dominance over a united legal regime. 
On the other hand, state recognition of the valid interpretations 
of all or multiple legal schools likely will decrease predictability, but 
increase opportunities for popular support and perhaps for the vin-
dication of minority interests.  This option would require the difficult 
task of working out a scheme that accommodates legal pluralism.  
There is some precedent for this.  For example, in early Islamic his-
tory, Muḥammad and succeeding scholars and community leaders 
adhered to a doctrine of allowing minority religious interpretations, 
even if they cut against Islamic (state) law.  This was famously repre-
 
certain locality, as espoused by Mālik, founder of one of the Sunnī schools.  See DUTTON, 
supra note 47 (discussing the methods used by Mālik to derive judgments from the 
Qur’an).  Mālik’s pupil, Shāfi‛ī, adopted this position but soon developed it into his own, 
which became the more mainstream notion:  consensus of “the majority of leading jurists 
in Muslim lands” for legal matters and the “agreement of the Muslim community” on 
matters of fundamentals.  Khadduri, supra note 47, at 32, 37–38.  It is worth noting that 
Shāfi‛ī’s concept is expressed in a Sunni prophetic ḥadīth that “my people will never agree 
on an error.”  Id. at 38.  Taking this statement to signify that the people represent God’s 
will (vox populi, vox Dei), id., the phrase provides a basis for Sunnī scholars to identify Is-
lamic roots of democracy.  See, e.g., Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democ-
racy, BOSTON REVIEW, Apr./May 2003, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR28.2/
abou.html (exploring the challenge of reconciling democracy with divine sovereignty).  
Amongst the Shī‛a, consensus originally referred to that of the Imams.  See MODARRESSI, 
supra note 37, at 3.  It only gradually came to signify that of the jurists.  In both spheres, 
the doctrine of consensus was difficult to apply historically because jurists agreed on no 
objective method for arriving at or identifying consensus beyond universal practices of 
the community.  Khadduri, supra note 47, at 38.  In fact, consensus was defined nega-
tively:  the absence of a claim against consensus for a particular matter; all else was a de-
rivative Islamic legal rule open to reasonable debate. 
 64 See infra text accompanying note 70. 
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sented in the maxim that “to each people are their own valid forms of 
marriage,” by which Zoroastrian marriages of mother to son, for ex-
ample, were permitted even though they were otherwise banned un-
der Islamic law.65  The thirteenth-century Mamlūk state (in modern-
day Egypt and Syria) convened a council of the four schools of Sunnī 
law.  And in the Ottoman Empire (r. 1299–1924), religious minorities 
followed their own laws in a “millet” system, their legal autonomy cir-
cumscribed to areas that did not offend public safety or public mores.  
These examples represent instances of prior attempts to grapple with 
the questions of rule-of-law with no single method or institution for 
interpretation capable of accommodating all of the inhabitants of an 
Islamic regime.  As such, they are historical instances that may be in-
structive to modern-day questions raised by Islamic constitutionalism 
in states with diverse populations.66  As discussed further below, an 
important question in either case involves how the state will access 
and recognize valid legal opinions—be they from Muslim jurists, non-
Muslim minorities, or otherwise. 
2.  Codification 
Given the structure of law and institutions under modern consti-
tutionalism, the Iraqi state will also have to decide whether to codify 
the law or leave it to juristic/judicial discretion.  Experiences of other 
countries again offer limited guidance on the precise form that Is-
lamic personal status law in Iraq will or should assume.  In analogous 
Islamic constitutions, there is no correlation between the constitu-
tional centrality of Islamic law to legislation (“a source” versus “the 
source”) and the codification of personal status laws.  Some countries 
that render Islamic law “the source” codify the laws of personal status 
(e.g., Iran, Egypt, and Yemen), while others leave personal status laws 
uncodified (e.g., Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE).  Some 
countries that render Islamic law “a source” similarly codify personal 
status laws (e.g., Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Sudan, and Syria), while 
others leave personal status laws uncodified (e.g., Bahrain).  The de-
cision of whether to codify and the determination of the content of 
the codification appears to depend very little on constitutional for-
mulations of the Islamic law incorporation and very much on domes-
 
 65 See SUYŪṬI ET AL., AL-WASĀ’IL ILA MA‘RIFAT AL-AWĀ‘IL 17:234 (Maktabat al-Khānjī 1980) 
(explaining that the principle is a particular statement of a more general rule:  “Every 
people who believes in something [according to their religion] is bound by [that relig-
ion’s] rules”); IBN QUDĀMĀ, MUGHNĪ (Maktabat al-Qāhirah 1968) 11:36 (same). 
 66 For another view, see Jackson, supra note 17, at 102–07. 
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tic politics and the local history of the state’s relationship with Islamic 
law or its exponents. 
Some have predicted that Islamic family law in Iraq will be un-
codified and left exclusively in the hands of the jurists, who will im-
pose restrictions on women’s marriage and divorce rights, among 
other things.67  Iraq does not seem to be on that path.  In 2004, Reso-
lution 137—a proposal to replace Iraq’s 1958 Personal Status Code 
with “sharī‘a” (as uncodified family law)—failed.  In designating an 
uncodified, amorphous body of law as the basis for family law, Reso-
lution 137 would have transferred personal status laws from a civil to 
a purely religious (juristic) jurisdiction.  Women activists played a 
prominent role in contesting the resolution, but its ultimate defeat 
likely had to do with constitutional and institutional concerns about 
the role of Islamic law on the grounds that an uncodified law would 
create enormous constitutional difficulties under the new Iraqi Con-
stitution.68 
The Iraqi Constitution incorporates Islamic law, but it does not 
shift all interpretive power to jurists or even to Islamic law courts.  In-
deed, the new Iraqi Constitution does not even create Islamic law 
courts, unlike the previous Iraqi regime.  Instead, it empowers the 
Supreme Federal Court to rule on the constitutionality of all legisla-
tion—which, it is to be remembered, includes Islamic law.  The Con-
stitution specifies that the Court will be made up of an unspecified 
number of judges, Islamic legal experts (jurists?), and ordinary legal 
experts.  The legislature must later determine the precise composi-
tion of the Court by a law that passes with a two-thirds majority par-
 
 67 See, e.g., Travis, supra note 3, at ¶ 100 (describing the plight of women in Afghanistan 
dealing with restrictions on their freedom of movement, dress, and rights in marriage 
and divorce).  But see Isobel Coleman, Women, Islam, and the New Iraq, FOREIGN AFF., 
Jan./Feb. 2006, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060101faessay85104/isobel-
coleman/women-islam-and-the-new-iraq.html (arguing that Islamic law incorporation will 
not necessarily harm women because Islamic law can be interpreted in many ways and 
that the United States can help support more egalitarian interpretations by supporting 
progressive Muslim scholars); Amira Sonbol, Women in Shari’ah Courts:  A Historical and 
Methodological Discussion, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 225 (2003) (arguing that pre-modern Is-
lamic family law was flexible and that modern codes have imposed patriarchal codifica-
tions of hybrid narrow interpretations of Islamic law mixed with Western law).  All this 
underscores the real concern with Islamic law incorporation, which Kristen Stilt insight-
fully highlighted:  what structure for legislation and interpretation will the Iraqi govern-
ment devise?  See Stilt, supra note 22, at 754 (listing a series of questions that Iraq must an-
swer as it develops its constitutional and governmental structures vis-à-vis Islamic law). 
 68 For a description of how women activists campaigned to prevent Resolution 137, which 
was approved by the Interim Governing Council, from becoming law, see http://www.
womenwarpeace.org/iraq/iraq.htm (last viewed Jan. 5, 2006) (login required). 
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liamentary vote.69  Thus, there are a few important points to consider 
about Iraqi-style constitutionalism and Islamic family law that help 
explain the failure of Resolution 137.  The Iraqi Constitution unam-
biguously and formally incorporates Islamic law; and this incorpora-
tion occurred subsequent to the Resolution 137 debate.  Moreover, the 
existing family law code—in which a vote against the Resolution was 
effectively a vote to keep the existing code—was based on Islamic law.  
Therefore, the defeat of Resolution 137—and its relation to the lar-
ger question of codification—was not about the propriety of incorpo-
rating Islamic law, but rather about how it should be done.  It was 
about the centrality of juristic authority in Islamic legal interpreta-
tion.  To see how, consider the perspectives of the parties both for 
and against the Resolution as a means of moving toward legal reform. 
Both supporters and opponents of Resolution 137 desired some 
measure of reform to existing family laws.  Opponents (certain politi-
cians and women’s activists) may have wanted reforms, but not if it 
meant they would have no say in those reforms.  Would a return to 
classical, uncodified Islamic law mean that only the jurists could in-
terpret, as historically they have done?  There was a fear that notwith-
standing the constitutional mandate to uphold both democratic and 
Islamic values, jurists could very well impose a form of family law that 
was too conservative and uncompromising for popular tastes and 
against which the populace could do nothing.  Resolution 137 signi-
fied the unchecked discretion of jurists to determine the law without 
popular, legislative, or judicial review.  It therefore represented an 
imposition of juristic interpretations on government branches in a 
way that does not comport with the democratic processes for legisla-
tion. 
Supporters of the Resolution (primarily certain jurists) wanted re-
forms that took juristic input into account.  Theirs was a proposition 
of institutional competence:  jurists are best equipped to interpret Is-
lamic law.  Their primary concern was that the existing codified law 
was skewed because its provisions were not the output of a proper Is-
lamic legal interpretive process.  This complaint followed from earlier 
juristic objections.  Iraqi jurists had challenged the existing Family 
Law Code because it does not adequately accommodate the Islamic 
 
 69 2005 Al-Dustūr al-‘Irāqī [Constitution] art. 93.2 (Iraq) (empowering the Supreme Federal 
Court to interpret the Constitution); id. art. 92.2 (specifying that the Court will be made 
up of an unspecified number of judges (quḍāt), Islamic legal experts (khubarā’ fī al-fiqh al-
islāmī), and legal experts (fuqahā’ al-qānūn), the composition of which is to be determined 
later by a two-thirds majority of the parliament). 
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legal pluralism under which various confessional and legal affiliations 
have traditionally functioned.  For example, Muḥammad Baḥr al-
‛Ulūm, a prominent Iraqi jurist, wrote a tract against the govern-
ment’s attempts to control Islamic family law.  His contentions still 
have some traction today.70  His was a critique of Sunnī dominance 
over Shī‛ī law, but the reverse challenge could arise if Shī‛ī law comes 
to dominate Sunnī law.  His point was that no single legal school 
should exclude another.  Perhaps the concerns of both supporters 
and opponents to the Revolution could be ameliorated by some of 
the balances that democratic institutions might bring to the task of 
Islamic legal interpretation for a diverse population. 
The family law debate raises one final point worth mentioning—
the extent to which Islamic constitutionalism is indigenous to Iraq.  I 
have argued that despite the defeat of Resolution 137, the subsequent 
incorporation of Islamic law indicates that the Iraqi people (or at 
least the people purporting to act on their behalf) will tolerate, and 
may even demand, a role for the jurists.  But for democratic and con-
stitutional concerns, they do not want a government and laws that are 
within the sole purview of the jurists.  It is difficult to attribute these 
outcomes to “the Iraqi people” point-blank, given that Iraq’s new 
governmental structure and constitutional project was heavily engi-
neered by the United States, is subject to enormous foreign influ-
ence, and continues to function under occupation.  American com-
mentators readily admit that democracy was “imposed,” though it is 
more difficult to assess the precise areas of foreign influence on Is-
lamic constitutionalism.71  One might venture to suggest though that 
Iraq’s Islamic constitutionalism arose from within. 
 
 70 See Stilt, supra note 22, at 751 n.268, 752 n.270 (citing MUHAMMAD BAḤR AL-‛ULŪM, AḌWA’ 
‛ALĀ QĀNŪN AL-AḤWĀL AL-SHAKHṢIYYA [SHEDDING LIGHT ON THE PERSONAL STATUS LAW] 
(1963) and noting that his critiques are still powerful amongst Shī‛ī politicians and jurists, 
having served as the impetus behind Resolution 137). 
 71 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857 (2005) (respond-
ing to criticisms of his role, as a foreigner and representative of the occupying force, in 
advising Iraq’s provisional government, but recognizing that an Iraqi Constitution ulti-
mately should be drafted and accepted by Iraqis themselves).  On the overall project, 
perception and substance play a key role to legitimacy and viability of Iraqi constitutional 
law.  See Aslı Ü. Bâli, Justice Under Occupation:  Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in 
Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 431, 445 (2005) (noting that challenges to establishing democ-
ratic rule of law “are further exacerbated by the fact that any new institutions are liable to 
be perceived as the products of occupation” and that, “[t]o inspire confidence in the rule 
of law, the legitimacy deficit suffered by institutions perceived as external impositions will 
have to be overcome”); cf. Gilbert S. Merritt, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, Reconstruction and Constitution Building in Iraq, Address at Vanderbilt 
University Law School (Jan. 23, 2004), in 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 765, 774, 778 (2004) 
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Iraq’s jurists, and leading Iraqi cleric Ayatollah ‛Alī al-Sistānī in 
particular, were influential in ensuring Iraq’s constitutional incorpo-
ration of Islamic law.72  In the Interim Period, Coalition Provisional 
Authority head Paul Bremer vowed to veto any constitution in the In-
terim Period that incorporated Islamic law.73  Sistānī directly coun-
tered this; he is credited with insisting on the incorporation of Is-
lamic law into the Constitution.  With his quiet opposition in a war of 
wills with the American-led CPA, Sistānī’s victory revealed the latent 
and not inconsiderable power and legitimacy that Iraqi jurists enjoy.  
Iraqi jurists are a strong, independent body with a long legacy of in-
tellectual activity and institutional development, particularly in the 
Shī‛ī learning center, Najaf.74  They have been active in the political 
arena since at least the Iraqi Revolution of 1958.75  Their victory in fa-
cilitating Islamic constitutionalism reflects their power and authority; 
 
(“[T]he promise we have made to Iraq [is] of a constitutional democracy, to be held up 
as a model in the Middle East. . . . Bremer has completely botched this job.  There are, I 
think, plausible reasons for our being there [in Iraq], but there is no plausible reason in 
my view for doing it the way we are doing it.”). 
 72 On Sistānī’s considerable influence, see Roy P. Mottahedeh, Keeping the Shi’ites Straight, 
RELIGION IN THE NEWS (Summer 2003), available at http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/
RINVol6No2/Keeping%20the%20Shi’ites%20Straight.htm (“[N]o other Iraqi mullah 
possesses his learning or piety, and he has more followers in the Twelver Shi’ite world 
than any other Source [of Imitation] alive. . . . It will be very hard, and possibly very un-
wise, to build a new Iraq without allowing some of the Shi´ite clergy to participate.”). 
 73 See Jim Krane, Touting Women’s Rights, U.S. Administrator Threatens Veto of Iraqi Islamic Law 
Measure, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16, 2004 (noting that head of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, Paul Bremer, feared that women’s rights would be “rolled back in the interim 
constitution . . . [through] Islamic restrictions”); see also Stilt, supra note 22, at 742–44 
(noting how the Drafters of Iraq’s Interim Constitution managed to incorporate Islamic 
law into the Constitution, over Bremer’s concerns, without any of the qualifiers that he 
suggested, like “principles of Islamic Sharia” and “a source of inspiration for the law”).  As 
discussed supra Part II, the permanent Constitution’s incorporation of Islamic law is 
worded with even more particularity.  See generally L. PAUL BREMER III & MALCOLM 
MCCONNELL, MY YEAR IN IRAQ:  THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A FUTURE OF HOPE (2006); Noah 
Feldman & Roman Martinez, Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq:  An Experiment 
in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (2006).  
 74 MALLAT, supra note 41, at 38 (noting that the juristic class is so strong and entrenched 
that it almost functions like a quasi-state, awarding stipends and setting curricula over 
which the government had no control); id. at 34–35 (“The jurists are not so much inter-
preters of the law as the exclusive interpreters of religious law, of law qua religion.  The 
uniqueness of modern Shi‛ism lies in the autonomous body of Shi‛i mujtahids who are 
vested with the protection of the law—and religion—through their interpretive power.” 
(first emphasis added)). 
 75 Most notably, the prominent jurist Muḥammad Bāqir Ṣadr became active in the Da‛wa 
party, see Mottahedeh, supra note 17, 30–31; see also JOYCE N. WILEY, THE ISLAMIC 
MOVEMENT OF IRAQI SHI’AS 73 (1992) (noting that the tensions became violent in 1979, 
but that the Iraqi jurists maintained a strong presence because, unlike the jurists of the 
Sunnī world, they remained relatively independent of the government). 
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but the defeat of Resolution 137 shows that there are limitations to 
that power in the context of Iraq’s fledgling democracy. 
III.  GOVERNMENTAL DECISION-MAKERS AND JURISTS AS A FOURTH 
BRANCH 
A central claim of this Article is that tensions between government 
branches and the juristic class face every Islamic constitutional coun-
try aspiring to a democratic government that resonates with its citi-
zens’ historical and religious sensibilities, and that these countries 
contemplate some relationship between the groups as a result.  The 
challenge of Islamic constitutionalism is twofold.  One challenge 
concerns the mere theoretical possibility of realizing a functional 
governmental structure in which religious norms constitutionally bal-
ance with human rights and democratic norms.  This might seem like 
a challenge facing every constitutional system that recognizes a role 
for or accommodates religion.  Yet there are added challenges in the 
Islamic constitutional context because of the trenchancy of Islamic 
law—an ostensibly religious law—as a source for state law.  Islamic po-
litical theorists have tended to resolve these challenges by dissociating 
stilted notions of Islamic law from dominance over state law. 
Another challenge concerns the practical workings of such sys-
tems.  Modern Islamic constitutional countries have each derived in-
dividual arrangements in this regard, with varying degrees of success 
and functionality.  Notably, Islamic constitutional governments that 
consider the place of Islamic law invariably have contemplated some 
relationship with the jurists—ranging from complete exclusion (in 
non-Islamic constitutional countries such as Turkey) to dominance 
(in Islamic constitutional countries such as Iran).76  In this context, 
the body of jurists typically included in these countries’ processes of 
legislation and adjudication may be seen as Islamic constitutional-
ism’s Fourth Branch of government. 
 
 76 Though I argue that all Islamic constitutional countries must deal with the question of 
the jurists’ role, the same is not true for other Muslim-majority countries, and this argu-
ment does not imply that the state relationship with the jurists will be inclusionary.  As 
noted, some, like Turkey, are completely secular, while others that purport to adhere to 
Islamic constitutionalism exclude jurists.  For a list of groupings in this context, including 
non-Islamic constitutional states, see Constitutionalism, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law in 
Iraq:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Iraq 
Hearing] (statement of Khaled Abou El Fadl, Professor of Islamic Law, UCLA School of 
Law), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=826&wit_id=2348; cf. Stilt, 
supra note 22, at 719 (describing the tension in Iran between different populations who 
disagree about the role of religion in government). 
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A.  Conceptual Frameworks 
A growing body of literature theorizes on the compatibility of “Is-
lam and democracy.”  As stated, the dichotomy may be misleading.  
Rather than comparing Islam (a religion) to democracy (a form of 
governance), these studies actually query whether support for the no-
tion of rule by the people can be found in sources on Islamic tradi-
tion.77  In general, the studies conclude that no inherent contradic-
tion exists by identifying the roots of democratic governance in 
Islamic legal and political thought and arguing that there are ways in 
which popular sovereignty can co-exist with divine sovereignty.78 
In Iraq’s Islamic constitutional context, such treatments rightly as-
sume that the Iraqi Constitution’s clauses on religion and Islamic law 
stand in some tension to the clauses on rights and democratic proc-
 
 77 The sources include two sets of literature:  Islamic political theory (legal and political 
texts that draw on Qur‘ānic precepts, the prophetic example, and historical practice in 
early Muslim societies under the caliphate system) and Islamic theology (the dogma that 
posits God as sovereign).  See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD:  AMERICA AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY (2003) (arguing for the possibility of Muslim democ-
racies); Abou El Fadl, supra note 63 (providing an example of Islamic political theory); 
Jackson, supra note 17 (arguing that Islamic theology can be the basis of a democracy, al-
though such a democracy may not conform to Western models). 
 78 See supra note 77.  But see Travis, supra note 3, ¶ 2 (“The new constitutions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq have enshrined Islam as the official religion and source of legislation, which no 
social policies may contravene.  This codification of religious fundamentalism was an in-
evitable byproduct, some observers contend, of the delegation of the nation-building 
process in both countries to religious extremists who enjoyed devoted followings of 
armed militiamen.”).  Abou El Fadl, Feldman, and others who argue that Islamic tradi-
tion comports with democratic forms of governance, tend to focus on procedural forms of 
democracy.  By contrast, Travis and others conclude that Islam and democracy are in-
compatible on the grounds that Islamic values are antithetical to substantive notions of 
democracy.  While democracy has many different definitions and types, it is enough for 
our purposes to note basic differences between substantive and procedural forms of de-
mocracy.  In my view, the procedural focus is a more solid mode of comparative analysis 
because:  (a) there is general consensus that procedural democracy is essential and basic 
to the meaning of democracy, whereas constitutions in robust democracies each enshrine 
different substantive values; and (b) it is closer to the analysis of the interpretive process 
that has been applied in the context of American law:  for example, where substantive 
constitutional values typically adopt procedural form.  See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Objectivity and 
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 751–55 (1982) (arguing that law borrows from moral-
ity when it comes to substantive notions like “liberty” and “equality,” that the extent of 
borrowing differs depending on the legal tradition, and that even positivism—which at-
tempts to separate law from morals—cannot do so absolutely because judges must try to 
give meaning to public moral values enshrined in the Constitution).  For common gen-
eral critiques of substantive democracy, see generally ROBERT DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 
(1998) (challenging representative democracy); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David 
Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale University Press 2003) (1859) (taking issue with the 
strictures that substantive rights place on democratic procedure). 
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esses.  In part, this tension is a regular feature even of “old” constitu-
tions that both recognize a role for religion and prohibit religious 
discrimination through a liberal democratic promise of equality.  For 
example, European Union Member nations Finland, Greece, and the 
United Kingdom each establish some form of Christianity as the offi-
cial state religion.  At the same time, the constitutions or laws of each 
country also contain provisions for the equality and rights of their 
citizens, regardless of religious affiliation.79  In these countries, the 
state must ensure that the established religion does not impinge on 
the freedoms of any of its citizens and that religion will never impede 
fair democratic processes.  The United States handles the religion-
state problem uniquely with its twin Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses.80  It, too, must ensure that its commitment to church-state 
separation does not impinge on the freedoms of its citizens.  In sum, 
these countries all seek to balance religion with democratic norms.81 
 
 79 See 2000 Suomen Perustuslaki [Constitution] § 76 (Fin.) (incorporating the Church Act, 
which regulates the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland and the Finnish Orthodox 
Church, according each legal protection and powers to levy taxes on their respective 
communities); id. at § 6 (equality clause); see also 2001 Syntamga [Constitution] art. 3, 
par. 1 (Greece) (specifying that the Greek-Orthodox dogma is the prevailing religion, 
that the Church of Greece is inseparably united in doctrine with the Ecumenical Patriar-
chate of Constantinople and with all other Orthodox Churches, and that the Church is 
self-administered).  The United Kingdom has no formal written constitution.  A combina-
tion of acts establish the Church as the state religion and require freedom of religion.  
E.g., Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 13 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts1998/19980042.htm (protecting the right to freedom of religion); Act of Settle-
ment, 1700, 6 Will. 3, c. 2, §§ II–III (Eng.), available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/
content.aspx?activeTextDocId=1565208 (requiring that anyone who will become a King 
or Queen of England to be a member of the Church of England). 
 80 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”).  Similar to European states, a host of statutes further define the contours of the 
Establishment/Free Exercise Clauses, and the Supreme Court clarifies the constitutional 
and statutory standards.  For the seminal case detailing requirements for legislation con-
cerning religion, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (declaring that 
while laws must have a “secular . . . purpose,” only “excessive . . . entanglement” renders 
them impermissible (emphasis added)). 
 81 Contrast this with France (an old constitution) and Turkey (a newer constitution—
ratified in 1982), in which secularism can curtail religious freedoms.  See 1958 CONST. 1 
(Fr.) (declaring France to be a secular nation); Loi du 9 décembre 1905 relative á sépara-
tion des Églises et de l’État, as amended July 29, 2005, tit. 1, art. 2, Journal Officiel de la 
République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], available at http://www.
assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/egliseetat/sommaire.asp, translation available at http://
www.concordatwatch.eu/showkb.php?org_id=867&kb_header_id=849&kb_id=1525&orde
r=kb_rank%20ASC (“La République ne reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subventionne aucun 
culte.”  [“The Republic does not recognize, salary, or subsidize any religion.”]); see also 
No. 288 Loi encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de 
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Iraq faces a similar challenge.  Its Constitution creates a system 
that establishes Islam as the state religion.  The added complication is 
that Iraq not only establishes a state religion, but it also incorporates 
a legal system of religious origin as a source of state law.  The extent 
and implications of this added challenge—particularly vis-à-vis the ju-
rists, given their historical role in interpreting Islamic law—are the 
subject of this Article. 
To be sure, like Iraq, some Western nations incorporate religion 
in legislation and adjudication.82  But unlike Iraq, such practices typi-
cally are doctrinally impermissible under their laws.  Most constitu-
tional systems direct legislators to draw upon secular sources for law-
making, and when constitutional courts review the propriety of such 
laws, they are to do so with respect to a secular legal regime.  By con-
trast, Iraq’s Constitution permits, indeed directs, legislators and 
judges to draw upon Islamic law.  Given the dual role for Islamic and 
democratic principles—as sources of law-making and adjudication—
how can Iraq negotiate its version of tensions between religion and 
the state? 
 
tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans écoles, collèges et lycées publics, 
Assemblée Nationale, Douzième Législature (2004), available at http://www.
assembleenat.fr/12/pdf/ta/ta-0253.pdf (forbidding the display of conspicuous religious 
symbols in the French public); Justin Vaïsse, Veiled Meaning:  The French Law Banning Reli-
gious Symbols in Public Schools (Brookings Institute, 2004) (noting that the law is also re-
ferred to as the “headscarf ban,” because of the Muslim religious symbols that it implicitly 
targeted, given previous calls and defeated proposals for a ban on headscarves).  France 
organizes religion through official religious councils, one of which is the French Council 
for the Muslim Religion formed in 2002 and 2003.  See Jonathan Laurence, From the Élysée 
Salon to the Table of the Republic:  State-Islam Relations and the Integration of Muslims in France, 
23 FRENCH POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y 37, 55 (2005) (describing the creation of the French 
Council of the Muslim Religion). 
   Compare Turkey’s similar form of religion-state separation that followed from Kemal 
Ataturk’s 1924 westernization movement and resulted in subordination of religion to 
state, following the French model of laïcité.  See 1982 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi 
[Constitution] art. 10 (Turk.) (equality clause); id. art. 14 (human rights clause); id. art. 
24 (freedom of religion); id. art. 2 (affirming the secular nature of the Turkish Republic).  
Until February 2008, Turkey had a similar ban on headscarves in public institutions; this 
ban was upheld by the European Court on Human Rights, see Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 
44774/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004), available at http://www.associazione
deicostituzionalisti.it/cronache/giurisprudenza_comunitaria/cedu_velo/Sentenza_cedu
_velo.pdf, but was recently overturned by the new Turkish Parliament, see Turkey and Is-
lam:  Veils of Half-Truth, ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2008, at 30. 
 82 See James Q. Whitman, Church and State:  Why Are America and Europe So Different?, 
3–7, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/kadish/Whitman%20Church%20and%20
State%20for%20Boalt%20091406.pdf (demonstrating the important role religion plays in 
American politics). 
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One proposal has been advanced by Abdolkarim Soroush, who 
has been described as the foremost thinker on Islam and democ-
racy.83  He suggests a conceptual framework for envisioning a robust 
democracy that is “religious.”84  For him, those who argue that Islam is 
incompatible with democracy do so only because they erroneously 
conceive of Islamic constitutional governments as ones that concen-
trate power in the hands of jurists and discriminate on the basis of 
gender and religion according to a monolithic view of the harshest 
legal rules articulated by jurists.  This obscures the processes of inter-
pretation and deliberation that can and should take place in a consti-
tutional democracy where “we the people” champion religious values 
in particular.  In fact, in his conception, a state would be described as 
religious only according to the popular will of the majority; and the 
voices of that religious majority would express themselves through 
democratic processes against the backdrop of constitutional protec-
tions for human rights and freedoms for minorities in particular.85 
Soroush contends that any potential conflicts that Islamic mores 
visit upon democratic processes emerge with apparent tensions be-
tween reason and revelation, but that such conflicts are overcome 
once revelation is understood in context.  As embodied in religion, 
he argues, revelation is nothing more than evolving religious under-
standing that has been articulated and updated (or not) through hu-
man interpretive processes.86  Thus understood, religion constitutes a 
rational discipline analogous to other scientific disciplines.  Like sci-
ence, which best approximates a description of the corporal world 
according to ongoing developments in an ever-changing field, relig-
ion reflects developing understandings of a moral universe.  Building 
upon past knowledge and new developments, the conclusions or 
theories of both science and religion expand and contract over time, 
achieving approximations that are at times closer to, and at other 
times far away from, the mark.87  Like scientific reasoning, religious 
 
 83 See FOROUGH JAHANBAKHSH, ISLAM, DEMOCRACY AND RELIGIOUS MODERNISM IN IRAN 
(1953–2000):  FROM BĀZARGĀN TO SOROUSH 143 (2001) (describing Soroush’s academic 
grounding in science, Islamic thought, and politics). 
 84 See SOROUSH, supra note 17, at 133–34.  There is some indication that Soroush recently 
has revised his views.  See infra note 87. 
 85 Id. at 145. 
 86 Id. at 134, 144. 
 87 This is the argument advanced in Soroush’s most famous (and most controversial) book:  
QABẒ VA BASAṬ-I TEORĪK-I SHARĪ‛AT:  NAẒARIYEH-YI TAKĀMOL-I MA‛REFAT-I DĪNĪ [EXPANSION 
AND CONTRACTION OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT:  A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF RELIGIOUS 
KNOWLEDGE] (7th ed. 2002).  But see ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH, REINVENTING THE 
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reasoning (interpretation) is not bound to pre-existing assumptions, 
and in that sense, he says, it is secular.88  For Soroush, a coherent 
form of practical reasoning should guide interpretation in both 
spheres, and its development should be facilitated by an open and 
democratic exchange of ideas.  In the sphere of religious democracy 
in particular, Soroush makes the Rawlsian argument that the role of 
reason is “collective . . . arising from the kind of public participation 
and human experience that are available only through democratic 
methods.”89 
For Soroush, advocating the primacy of reason over religion in the 
sphere of governance is different from advocating Western “ex-
treme liberalism,”90 which should not be equated to democracy it-
self.91  Soroush subscribes to a proceduralist view of democracy.  For 
him, democracy requires elections (popular sovereignty and political 
process) and a separation of powers (institutional structure).92  And 
liberal democracy limits the decisions of the populace and their insti-
tutions with certain Western Enlightenment and Revolutionary ideals, 
such as particular forms of equality, freedom, and other substantive 
rights.93  These liberal values enrich the system and promote justice 
even as they limit absolute expressions of popular will and aim to 
prevent undesirable outcomes—like Nazism, fascism, or invidious dis-
crimination.  That these values place strictures on the popular will 
may render them undemocratic according to proceduralist views 
such as Mill’s; yet these same liberal values reflect ideals that the peo-
ple once selected or to which they at least acquiesce.94 
Soroush argues that religious democracy—where the substantive 
values extend from religion—is similar.  For example, in Islamic intel-
lectual and legal history, considerations of the public interest and 
God’s justice extend from rational theological and philosophical dis-
cussions.95  In general, the argument goes, values are not legal, but 
ethical; they are rational expressions of the evolving moral sense of 
society at large, extra-legal sentiments of the populace that give rise 
 
MU’TAZILITE EXPERIMENT (forthcoming) (possibly distancing himself from these earlier 
views). 
 88 SOROUSH, supra note 17, at 67. 
 89 Id. at 127. 
 90 Id. at 134. 
 91 Id. at 68, 134, 144. 
 92 Id. at 134. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 151. 
 95 Id. at 128–29. 
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to particular laws.96  Democracy that recognizes religion or Islamic law 
merely introduces other substantive values and supports a compli-
mentary relationship between governance and religion:  citizens may 
dissent by calling upon shared religious mores to play a role in con-
structively critiquing state action on moral grounds and may thereby 
augment values of justice, freedom, and liberty.97 
In his reflections about democratic theory in a religious context, 
Soroush draws upon his critique of the Iranian experiment, which he 
views as a failed attempt at democratic Islamic constitutionalism.  But 
he does not conclude that such attempts always must fail.  Rather, he 
insists that governments can be both religious and democratic, pro-
vided they take a dynamic view of legal interpretation98 and negotiate 
the proper relationship with the juristic branch in doing so.  The im-
plication is that in Iraq, if the people followed democratic processes 
of constitutional ratification and elections to select a form of religious 
and liberal democracy that incorporates Islamic law,99 this arrange-
ment must be respected.  It is up to the government, under this 
scheme, to contemplate the substance of the Constitution’s multiple 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 142, 152–53 (“Religions, as bulwarks of morality, can serve as the best guarantors of 
democracy.”); cf. generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993); STEPHEN L. 
CARTER, DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED:  A MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 
(1998).  Of course the sticking point between constitutional and Islamic law scholars on 
the one hand and Islamists who promote a form of traditional Islamic law on the other is 
whether pre-modern values override rather than augment modern conceptions of justice, 
freedom, and liberty. 
 98 Without using the phrase, Soroush uses the idea of “dynamic interpretation” developed 
by American legal scholars.  See, e.g., RICHARD FALLON, THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION 
(2004); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).  The 
idea of dynamism is countered by formalism or new textualism in the American context, 
and by salafī readings in the Islamic legal context, in which foundational or constitutional 
texts are seen to be static documents that should be interpreted according to original in-
tent.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) (laying out the new 
textualist approach); John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 120–28 (2001) (arguing that the Constitution constrains the authority to interpret 
and noting that the proper role of the judiciary is not to be an interstitial law-maker 
through broad interpretation but a “faithful agent” to the legislature).  Justice Scalia has 
been quoted as saying, “The Constitution is not a living organism, it is a legal document.  
It says something and doesn’t say other things. . . . [Y]ou would have to be an idiot to be-
lieve that [the Constitution] . . . has to change with society, like a living organism . . . .”  
Jonathan Ewing, Scalia Has Harsh Words for Those Who Believe in ‘Living Constitution,’ 
LAW.COM, Feb. 15, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1139911515240.  The 
salafī originalist debate with Islamic legal “dynamists” is less well (or colorfully) docu-
mented in the secondary literature, but the parallels are close. 
 99 For a discussion of the extent to which Iraq’s constitutional drafting and ratification was a 
result of legitimate democratic processes, see supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
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components and to determine exactly where Islamic law falls within 
that scheme. 
A second proposal takes up where the latter left off.  Islamic legal 
scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl argues that democracy is the best system 
for Islamic governance100 and arguably may be taken to suggest that 
jurists can or should play a consultative role in defining the nature 
and content of Islamic law for a democratic Islamic constitutional re-
gime: 
I would suggest Shari‛ah ought to stand in an Islamic polity as a symbolic 
construct for the divine perfection that is unreachable by human ef-
fort. . . . Jurists ought to continue to explore the ideal of Shari‛ah and to 
expound their imperfect attempts at understanding God’s perfection.  As 
long as the argument constructed is normative it is unfulfilled potential 
to reach the Divine Will.  Significantly, any law applied is necessarily a po-
tential-unrealized.  Shari‛ah is not simply a collection of ahkam (a set of 
positive rules) but also a set of principles, a methodology, and a discour-
sive process that searches for the divine ideals.  As such, Shari‛ah is a 
work in progress that is never complete. 
To put it more concretely:  if a legal opinion is adopted and enforced 
by the state, it cannot be said to be God’s law.101 
By acknowledging the limited yet present role of Islamic law, Abou El 
Fadl is doing three things:  (1) acknowledging the jurists as the his-
torical interpreters of Islamic law, thereby (2) suggesting some state 
recognition for their deliberations, but (3) insisting that such delib-
erations must not receive more authoritative weight than due. 
This view follows historical trends in Islamic political theory, albeit 
in the new guise of discussions concerning Islamic constitutionalism 
and democracy.  Jurists historically have long enjoyed interpretive le-
gal authority and have been viewed as the repositories of institutional 
competence necessary to interpret and articulate Islamic law.  This 
was a result of twin theoretical and historical circumstances:  the idea 
 
100 Abou El Fadl, supra note 38, at 10 (“In my view, there are several reasons that commend 
democracy, and especially a constitutional democracy, as the system most capable of 
promoting the ethical and moral imperatives of Islam. . . . [I]n essence, I would argue 
that a democracy offers the greatest potential for promoting justice, and protecting human 
dignity, without making God responsible for human injustice or the infliction of degrada-
tion by human beings upon one another. . . . A constitutional democracy avoids the prob-
lem [of ‘having a small group of people appointing themselves as the voice of God, and 
speaking in God’s name’] by enshrining some basic moral standards in a constitutional 
document, and thus, guarantees some discernment and differentiation, but, at the same 
time, a democracy insures that no single person or group becomes the infallible repre-
sentative of divinity.”). 
101 Abou El Fadl, supra note 63 (arguing that human effort can determine a course of action 
that is potentially synonymous with God’s law, but human action is always necessarily im-
perfect). 
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that the community leader was to uphold Islamic law102 and that the 
jurists were to be independent from the state.103  Thus, jurists con-
cerned with the ruler’s obligations to Islamic law (and thus to God 
and the community) attempted to delineate, and perhaps restrict, ar-
eas of his discretionary authority over matters of administration and 
law.104  The inverse of the ruler’s legal jurisdiction was theirs.  In or-
der for him to follow and apply the law, jurists reasoned, he would 
have to consult with them or yield authority over purely legal deter-
minations to them.  To support their arguments, typically jurists cum 
political theorists contemplated an informal arrangement, calling up 
historical precedents where Muslim rulers consulted the jurists—
from the Prophet through the ‛Abbāsid caliphs.105  Some even en-
 
102 Indeed, the first idea was the raison d’être of the state and the basis for a ruler’s claim to 
legitimate authority over a Muslim polity.  See, e.g., MUḤAMMAD B. AL-ṬAYYIB AL-BĀQILLĀNĪ, 
AL-TAMHĪD FĪ AL-RADD ‘ALĀ AL-MULḤIDA AL-MU‘AṬṬALA WA-AL-RĀFIḌA WA-AL-KHAWĀRIJ WA-
AL-MU‛TAZILA 56 (Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi 1989); ABŪ AL-ḤASAN ‘ALĪ B. MUḤAMMAD AL-
MĀWARDĪ, AL-AḤKĀM AL-SULṬĀNIYYA [THE LAWS OF ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE] ch. 1 
(Muḥammad Fahmī al-Sarjānī ed., Wafaa Wahba trans. [THE ORDINANCES OF 
GOVERNMENT], 1996) (1978); IBN AL-JAWZĪ, 1 AL-MIṢBĀḤ AL-MUḌĪ’ FĪ AL-KHILĀFAT AL-
MUSTAḌĪ’ 93 (Ibrahim Najiyya ed., Matba‘at al-Awqaf 1979); see also YUSUF IBISH, THE 
POLITICAL DOCTRINE OF AL-BAQILLANI (1966).  For Shī‘ī views, see AL-SHARĪF AL-
MURTAḌĀ, AL-SHĀFĪ FĪ AL-IMAMA; see also A. K. S. LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN 
MEDIEVAL ISLAM 219–69 (1981), and Wilfred Madelung, Imāma, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ISLAM 2d ed. 1163–69 (1954–2005). 
103 See, e.g., Abou El Fadl, supra note 38, at 30–31 (“[B]y the . . . 10th century, Muslim jurists 
had established themselves as the legitimate and exclusive authority empowered to ex-
pound the law of God.  Only the jurists were deemed to possess the requisite level of 
technical competence and learning that would qualify them to investigate and interpret 
the Divine will. . . . However, pursuant to the powers derived from its role as the enforcer 
of Divine laws, the State was granted a broad range of discretion over what were consid-
ered matters of public interest [known as the field of al-siyasah al-Shar‘iyyah].  The State’s 
rule-making activity in the exercise of this discretion was considered to be akin to regula-
tory administrative rules that have temporal weight, but that are not a part of binding 
precedents of Shari‘ah law.” (second alteration in original)). 
104 This pushed Māwardī to write what is regarded as the first treatise exclusively devoted to 
the subject, written at a time when caliphal authority was waning and de facto rulers (sul-
tans) threatened to assert increasing authority over matters of law.  See generally MĀWARDĪ, 
supra note 102 (explaining the contours, jurisdiction, and interactions of administrative 
law, or even administrative prerogative, to determine the law with respect to Islamic law); 
see also JACKSON, supra note 23; Sherman Jackson, From Prophetic Action to Constitutional 
Theory:  A Novel Chapter in Medieval Muslim Jurisprudence, 25 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 71, 
71–90 (1993). 
105 See, e.g., IBN AL-JAWZĪ, supra note 102, 216–20 (Nājiyya ‛Abd al-Allāh Ibrāhīm ed., n.d.) 
(noting that the first caliph, Abū Bakr, is said to have instructed the scholars to advise 
him, telling them to correct him if he strayed, that Umayyad Caliph Sulayman b. ‛Abd al-
Mālik, used to consult with [Meccan jurist] ‛Aṭā’ b. Abī Rabāḥ, and that likewise ‛Abbāsid 
Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd would ask [Medinan jurist and Mālikī-school eponym] Mālik b. 
Anas and others for their input, as did ‛Abbāsid Caliphs Amīn and Ma’mūn); see also Abou 
El Fadl, supra note 63, at 7 (“The Qur’an instructs the Prophet to consult regularly with 
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couraged a formal relationship.  For example, Ibn al-Jawzī argued 
that a ruler should ensure the presence of the “major scholars” at his 
decision-making sessions.106 
Such historical precedent offers both opportunities and chal-
lenges to the idea of a functioning democracy under Islamic constitu-
tionalism.  On the one hand, pre-modern jurists’ theories concerning 
Islamic law and the state could be seen as imposing a requirement of 
limiting government by the rule of law.  These theories could provide 
an opportunity for a historically grounded ideal of limited powers in 
the government and amongst the jurists in an Islamic constitutional 
state.  And they could be seen to restrict the scope of juristic compe-
tence to matters that involve religio-legal issues rather than political-
administrative or factual determinations.107  Accordingly, they also 
may suggest more ready acceptance amongst the populace (“We the 
People”) of Muslim-majority states and thus legitimacy for the gov-
ernment.  All of these conceptions could serve to bolster and temper 
the modern proposals concerning Islamic constitutionalism. 
But on the other hand, pre-modern juristic theories pose chal-
lenges to a democratic constitutional ideal because of the possibilities 
for abuse.  For example, these same theories of law-limited rule have 
been viewed (among early and modern jurists) as a requirement to 
implement particular rules of Islamic law.108  Abou El Fadl has noted 
that this is problematic because Islamic law is seen as a static body of 
rules divorced from the complexities and dynamism of legal interpre-
tation: 
[W]e must distinguish between the idea of the supremacy of law, and the 
supremacy of legal rules. . . . [A] government could implement Shari‘ah 
criminal penalties, prohibit usury, dictate rules of modesty, and so on, 
 
Muslims on all significant matters and indicates that a society that conducts its affairs 
through some form of deliberative process is considered praiseworthy in the eyes of God 
(3:159; 42:38).  There are many historical reports suggesting that the Prophet consulted 
regularly with his Companions regarding the affairs of the state.  In addition, shortly after 
the death of the Prophet, the concept of shura (consultative deliberations) had become a 
symbol signifying participatory politics and legitimacy.”). 
106 E.g., IBN AL-JAWZĪ, supra note 102, at 216. 
107 See Iraq Hearing, supra note 76, at 16. 
108 For example, the obligation for rulers to uphold Islamic law for the purpose of preserving 
law and order in the public sphere has been expressed in terms of imposing fixed crimi-
nal penalties.  E.g., MĀWARDĪ, supra note 102, at 312; ABŪ ISḤĀQ IBN FARḤŪN, 2 TABṢIRAT 
AL-ḤUKKĀM FĪ USŪL AL-AQḌIYA WA MANĀHIJ AL-AḤKĀM 115–16 (Beirut 1995); QARĀFĪ, 3 
TAHDHĪB AL-FURŪQ WA AL-QAWĀ’ID AL-SUNNIYYA FĪ AL-ASRĀR AL-FIQHIYYA 845 (Cairo, 1926–
1928).  In the modern day, it has been expressed in similar terms in Northern Nigeria, 
for instance, where a return to Islamic law has meant in part a return to imposing fixed 
criminal penalties. 
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and yet remain a government of unlimited powers not subject to the rule 
of law.  This is because Shari‘ah is a general term for a multitude of legal 
methodologies and a remarkably diverse set of interpretive determina-
tions.109 
In more specific terms, these theories could be taken to ignore the 
role of human agency and the deliberative-consultative process in in-
terpreting the law.  These ideas, too, were amply represented in Is-
lamic tradition.  One anecdote, for instance, tells of a time of strife 
between ‘Alī (the fourth caliph) and his one-time followers, who dis-
puted his decision to submit to arbitration to resolve Umayyad con-
tender Mu‛āwiya’s challenge to his caliphate: 
‘Ali touched the Qur’an while instructing it to inform the people about 
God’s law.  Surprised, the people gathered around ‘Ali exclaimed, “What 
are you doing?!  The Qur’an cannot speak, for it is not a human being.”  
Upon hearing this, ‘Ali exclaimed that this is exactly the point he is try-
ing to make.  The Qur’an, ‘Ali explained, is but ink and paper, and it 
does not speak for itself.  Instead, it is human beings who give effect to it 
according to their limited personal judgments and opinions.110 
According to Abou El Fadl, realizing this can avoid the “dogmatic su-
perficiality of proclamations of God’s dominion or sovereignty in or-
der to legitimate and empower what are fundamentally human de-
terminations.”111 
*  *  * 
Considered together, these conceptual proposals for a functional 
Islamic constitutional government yield a few indispensable observa-
tions.  The scholars advancing these views argue that a successful gov-
ernment in that context acknowledges the indeterminacy of the law 
and the difference between political and religious jurisdictions, ad-
mits the human agency of jurists and legislators in interpreting the 
law, and recognizes the historical and institutional competence of the 
jurists while avoiding establishing or permitting their structural or in-
stitutional dominance over the legislative or legal interpretive sphere.  
These offer useful points to bear in mind when considering new Is-
lamic constitutional states like Iraq, stopping just short of suggesting 
practical forms that such collaboration and reconsideration between 
the government and the jurists might take.  Those issues cannot be 
 
109 Abou El Fadl, supra note 38, at 28. 
110 Id. at 15–16 (citing 14 AHMAD B. ‘ALĪ B. ḤAJAR AL-‛ASQALĀNĪ, FATḤ AL-BĀRĪ BI-SHARḤ AL-
BUKHĀRĪ 303 (Dar al-Fikr 1993); 7 MUHAMMAD B. ‘ALĪ AL-SHAWKĀNĪ, NAYL AL-AWTĀR:  
SHARḤ MUNTAQĀ AL-AKHBĀR MIN AḤĀDĪTH SAYYID AL-AKHYĀR 166 (Dar al-Hadith 1993)). 
111 Id. at 16. 
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predicted, for they depend on further elaboration of the Iraqi Consti-
tution by Iraqi law-makers and adjudicators.  But existing models that 
have charted various paths in that regard may be helpful in concep-
tualizing possible arrangements. 
B.  Comparative Models 
One way of examining questions of the governmental arrange-
ment that Islamic constitutionalism might assume is to examine the 
forms that it has assumed in other countries in the region.  Regional 
Islamic constitutional countries present three models of institutional 
relations between the government and the jurists, with respect to Is-
lamic legal interpretation.  At one extreme is dominant constitution-
alization, in which the constitution empowers the jurists to specify the 
content of Islamic law and its interpretation directly, and gives their 
views priority over political or judicial processes.  Here, the govern-
ment derives its very authority from religious texts, and so vests ulti-
mate interpretation in the hands of religiously oriented jurists.  At 
the other extreme is delegated constitutionalization, in which the 
constitution specifies that Islamic law will remain uncodified, to be 
determined by jurists in sharī‘a courts.  Ostensibly, the government 
maintains control over these courts.  But when it staffs them with ju-
rists to whom it delegates authority not only to evaluate Islamic legal 
matters, but also to legislate them, it too vests ultimate interpretation 
in the hands of the jurists.  For both of these extremes, the Fourth 
Branch remains unchecked except within the confines of the com-
munity of jurists itself.  In the middle is a type of constitutionalization 
that may be called coordinate.  Here, the government seeks to main-
tain a system of checks-and-balances and separation-of-powers famil-
iar to many modern democracies.  The head of state is to be popu-
larly elected and control executive affairs, a popularly elected 
parliament is to exercise legislative authority, and state-appointed 
judges are to wield exclusive adjudicative authority.  In practice, the 
Islamic law incorporation implies a merely consultative role for the 
jurists in the state institutions’ law-making processes. As outlined be-
low, the extent of, and mechanisms for, juristic involvement in each 
model vary. 
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1.  Dominant Constitutionalization 
The paradigmatic example of dominant constitutionalization of 
Islamic law is Iran.112  Iran’s Constitution designates Shī‛īsm as the of-
ficial religion,113 makes Islamic criteria the basis for all legislation,114 
and includes an Islamic law non-contradiction clause.115  Thus, struc-
turally, the Constitution ensures that jurists will dominate each gov-
ernmental branch. 
As for the legislature, a body called the Guardian Council makes 
determinations of each law’s compliance with Islamic legal rules 
through an automatic right to review all legislation.116  Members of 
this body may also guide legislation by attending parliamentary ses-
sions and commenting on draft laws as they are debated.117  The 
Council comprises six jurists and six legal experts, all of whom are 
elected by Parliament from amongst the Muslim jurists screened by 
the Supreme Judicial Council and nominated by the Head of the Ju-
dicial Power.118  Members of the Supreme Judicial Council are classi-
 
112 Islamic elements appear in 125 articles of the Iranian Constitution.  See ASGHAR SCHIRAZI, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN:  POLITICS AND THE STATE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 8 (1997). 
113 1980 Qānūn-i Asāsī-yi Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān [Basic Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(as amended)] arts. 12–14.  The constitution permits minority (Sunnī) Islamic schools to 
act in accord with their own laws for religious rites, personal status, and related litigation 
in the courts, id. art. 12, accords similar confessional deference to designated non-Muslim 
religious minorities, id. art. 13, and “tolerates” non-Muslims, id. art. 14. 
114 Id. art. 4 (“All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, 
and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria [mavāzīn-i Islām].”). 
115 Id. art. 72 (“The Islamic Consultative Assembly [Parliament] cannot enact laws contrary 
to the official religion of the country or to the Constitution.  It is the duty of the Guard-
ian Council to determine whether a violation has occurred, in accordance with Article 
96.”). 
116 Id. art. 96 (“The majority of jurists (3) of the Guardian Council shall decide whether or 
not the legislation passed by the Parliament is in conformity with Islam’s [legal] rulings 
(aḥkām-i Islām) . . . .”); id. art. 98 (“The interpretation of the Constitution shall be the re-
sponsibility of the Guardian Council . . . .”); id. art. 94 (“All enactments of the Parliament 
shall be submitted to the Guardian Council and the Council shall examine them within 
ten days after the receipt thereof to see whether or not they reconcile with the tenets of 
Islam and constitutional law.  If the Guardian Council finds the enactments contrary to Is-
lamic tenets and constitutional law, it shall return them to Parliament for reconsidera-
tion.”); cf. MALLAT, supra note 41, at 80–81 (noting the incomparably expansive powers of 
this state council when compared to the review functions of State Councils in France and 
Germany). 
117 1980 Qānūn-i Asāsī-yi Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān [Basic Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(as amended)] arts. 95–98 (detailing the Guardian Council’s powers of review, atten-
dance, and approval); cf. MALLAT, supra note 41, at 82 (describing the likely composition 
of the Council). 
118 1980 Qānūn-i Asāsī-yi Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān [Basic Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(as amended)] art. 91 (defining jurists as fuqahā’, legal experts as ḥuqūqdān). 
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cally trained jurists,119 and its Head is selected by the Supreme Leader, 
who is himself a classically trained jurist.120  Thus the Guardian Coun-
cil, despite its formal attachment to the legislature, is dominated by a 
judiciary made up of classically trained jurists who ensure the promi-
nence of like-minded jurists on the Council.121  All this results in what 
has been termed an inevitable “institutionalized juristic quality of the 
Council of the Guardians.”122 
Iraq’s Islamic law constitutionalization is very different from 
Iran’s.  Structurally, Iraq neither incorporates the jurists into the gov-
ernmental structure directly, nor does it specify the criteria for their 
training or orientation, as Iran does through the Guardianship of the 
Jurists doctrine.  By equating Islamic norms with democratic and 
human rights norms, the Iraqi Constitution implicitly requires that 
any role the government subsequently specifies for jurists in the de-
terminations over Islamic law should be coordinate, as described be-
low.  Kristen Stilt has pointed out that the Iranian model is an inap-
posite comparison for other reasons as well:  leading Shī‛ī clerics 
reject the Khomeini formulation of the Guardianship of the Jurists 
doctrine, many Shī‛īs in the lay population are critical of Iran with 
the experience of hindsight, and the Iraqi population is more relig-
iously diverse than that of Iran—with a mix of Shī‛īs, Sunnīs and 
other substantial minorities.123 
2.  Delegated Constitutionalization 
Examples of delegated constitutionalization include many of the 
Gulf countries:  Bahrain (Shī‛ī majority, Shāfi‛ī and Mālikī minority), 
the United Arab Emirates (Sunnī majority, Shī‛ī minority), Qatar 
(Ḥanbalī majority), Oman (Ibāḍī majority), and Saudi Arabia 
(Ḥanbalī majority).124  These countries have no codified family law, 
 
119 Id. art. 162 (mandating that the Chief of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General 
be “just honorable men well versed in judicial matters”); cf. MALLAT, supra note 41, at 82 
(arguing that the Council will be dominated by classically trained jurists). 
120 1980 Qānūn-i Asāsī-yi Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān [Basic Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(as amended)] arts. 109–110 (setting out the qualifications and duties of the Supreme 
Leader). 
121 MALLAT, supra note 41, at 82 (describing the comprehensive authority of the Supreme 
Judicial Council over selection of Guardian Council members). 
122 Id. at 82. 
123 See Stilt, supra note 22, at 719.  For further background on Shī‛ī differences regarding the 
Guardianship of the Jurists doctrine during its formative stages in Iraq, see MALLAT, supra 
note 41, at 59–78; SCHIRAZI, supra note 112, at 45–58. 
124 Countries that do not incorporate Islamic law through the constitution, but that do apply 
Islamic law to Muslims, also fall within the full judicialization framework.  Examples in-
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and instead direct judges to impose classical Islamic law according to 
the schools that the citizens follow.  Ostensibly, judges who are non-
specialists in Islamic law render decisions according to juristic formu-
lations as found in classical written texts and/or summarized for easy 
consumption in the modern period.  This arrangement results in a 
formally narrow scope of discretion (restricted to the scope of classi-
cal Islamic law for particular legal schools) that is very broad in prac-
tice (from the indeterminacy of that law).  Critics complain that 
judges use this broad interpretive discretion to issue rulings unfavor-
able to women in areas of family law.125  This is no doubt exacerbated 
by the fact that most judges and jurists in the Gulf follow a conserva-
tive brand of Islamic law with governmental support.  Without codifi-
cation, Islamic family law has no popular legislative origin, and with 
full judicialization of its content, there is no review.  As discussed 
above concerning the attempts to de-codify Iraqi family law, this con-
stitutional scheme differs markedly from that of Iraq.126 
3.  Coordinate Constitutionalization 
Other Islamic constitutional systems that are more attentive to the 
demands of procedural democracy have codified family law codes 
and seek to incorporate Islamic law through the political process, the 
judicial process, or some combination of both.  In political terms, the 
contribution of jurists occurs at the stage of a law’s formation in the 
legislature, while in judicial terms, the contribution is at the stage of 
judicial review.  The following two examples of Egypt and Morocco 
illustrate these differences, showing how the government’s relation-
ship with the jurists may be formal or informal, amicable or strained.  
In Egypt (a purportedly constitutional, presidential democracy), gov-
ernmental-juristic relations are strained and informal, with most fam-
ily law developments occurring at the judicial level; in Morocco (a 
purportedly constitutional, democratic monarchy) they are amicable 
 
clude many African countries like Nigeria (Mālikī) and the Gambia (Mālikī), as well as Is-
rael (Ḥanafī). 
125 See, e.g., Bahrain:  Controversy over Reform for Family Law, ARAB REFORM BULL. (Carnegie 
Endowment for Int’l Peace, Wash. D.C.), Nov. 2005, at 8, http://www.carnegie
endowment.org/files/fullissue_nov055.pdf (noting efforts to reform family law in Bah-
rain through a push for codification). 
126 See the discussion on codification and the failed attempt to de-codify family law through 
Resolution 137, supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text (distinguishing the Iraqi system 
from Gulf-style uncodified systems). 
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and sometimes formal, as in the case of its recent family law re-
forms.127 
a.  Judicialization 
The Egyptian legal system is an example of a system that functions 
under a regime of judicialization,128 directing the courts to resolve 
disputes over textual interpretation of codified Islamic personal status 
laws.129  In Egypt, judges rule on the basis of secular standards, and 
only when required to draw upon Islamic law as a residual source do 
they consider consulting the jurists.130  This arrangement excludes the 
jurists.  Judges are concerned with judicial independence and auton-
omy, and their desire to avoid resorting to the jurists becomes prob-
lematic when it creates incentives to apply a form of classical Islamic 
family law; they maintain that the law is unambiguous, and thus there 
is no need to consult the jurists formally.131  A further problem is that 
the Egyptian judiciary—one of the more independent in the re-
gion—functions under the auspices of and in support of a strong ex-
ecutive that controls larger constitutional questions, such as the scope 
of Islamic law and the function of democracy.  The judiciary self-
consciously limits its own power out of deference to a strong and in-
 
127 There are many other examples that suggest similarities between the Moroccan and 
Egyptian models, but these two suffice to give an overall view of family law in Islamic con-
stitutional democracies.  Egypt is the model of law in the Arab world, its laws having 
greatly influenced the formation of the laws of other countries in the region with its 
modern developments providing a reference point for other countries.  See generally 
NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD:  COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE 
GULF 63 (1997) (discussing the changes made to the Egyptian court system in the 1950s).  
Morocco is notable for its recent legal reforms and their positive reception in the local 
and international communities. 
128 On the judicialization of politics as a global trend, see Ran Hirschl, Resituating the Judici-
alization of Politics:  Bush v. Gore as a Global Trend, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 191, 197 (2002) 
(reviewing the role of courts in various countries’ political developments). 
129 For a description of how this process works, see Stilt, supra note 22, at 722–39, which de-
scribes the general narrowing of influence of the Sharī‘a on the law, though it remains 
the guiding force—whether codified or uncodified—in personal status laws, which in-
clude family-related issues. 
130 Id. at 730 (“[T]he Sharia is a residual source of law to be used by a judge if the Civil Code 
is silent on a particular issue.”). 
131 See Stilt, supra note 22, at 727 (noting that Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court “has on 
several occasions upheld legislation from an Article 2 challenge and, while explaining 
why the particular law does not violate the clear meaning of a Qur’anic provision, has 
mentioned as dicta propositions that the SCC does consider definite in terms of meaning 
and authenticity” (citing Frank E. Vogel, Conformity with Islamic Shari’a and Constitutional-
ity Under Article 2:  Some Issues of Theory, Practice, and Comparison, in DEMOCRACY, THE RULE 
OF LAW AND ISLAM 527, 541–42 (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1999))). 
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trusive state, and it prefers deference to the executive over deference 
to the jurists.132  The ironic, and perhaps unintended, consequence of 
an independent judiciary and a strong executive that excludes juristic 
input is a self-imposed restriction on reform in the courts.133  This 
may have a trickle-up effect to the legislature; absent lower-court dis-
putes, the legislature has little internal reason or justification to re-
solve judicial disputes or to create sweeping reforms with respect to 
possible developments in juristic interpretations of Islamic family 
law.134  That impetus would have to come from elsewhere. 
b.  Political Process 
The Moroccan system is an example of a regime of greater politi-
cization.  There, the government consulted the jurists in the process 
of reformulating the country’s personal status laws.  To be sure, 
courts will have to resolve subsequent interpretive issues, but after the 
governmental-juristic coordinate political process of articulating Is-
lamic family law, courts will have received more express guidance for 
doing so within the confines of Islamic legal precepts.  Moreover, a 
political process that orients itself toward juristic inclusion may stymie 
 
132 See BROWN, supra note 127, at 63 (noting that the transplant of the French legal codes was 
not merely the result of France’s colonial enterprise, but a result of Egyptian legal re-
former Sanhūrī and the judges’ self-conscious attempt to limit their own authority in or-
der to provide support for the officially sanctioned order:  a strong and intrusive state 
that would withstand internal and external pressures). 
133 But see Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law:  The Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1043 (2004) (arguing that judges defer to jurists in a way that constrains 
the law and that reform from within the religious framework is an untenable proposition 
due to the limits imposed by classical formulations of Islamic law that reflect a pre-
modern patriarchal system).  Abu-Odeh suggests that for true reform to occur, family law 
should be fully secularized.  Her analysis reflects a view that Islamic law is composed of 
substantive legal rules only, rather than substance and procedures for interpretation that 
may allow jurists to accommodate modern non-patriarchal sentiments.  It also suggests 
that the rigidity of Islamic law that belies reform in the Egyptian context is unrelated to 
the judicialization of Islamic law. 
134 Cf. Hirschl, supra note 128, at 214–15 (arguing that judicialization makes politicians 
abandon the deliberative process in favor of policy preferences, constitutes either the ju-
dicial flouting of legislative supremacy or legislative abdication of responsibility, and—
inasmuch as the judiciary sets values rather than resolves disputes—makes judicial review 
difficult to justify by the theory of the judiciary as the “Least Dangerous Branch”).  In ef-
fect, Hirschl’s argument suggests that attempts to overcome the counter-majoritarian dif-
ficulty that attach to judicial review, like those of Alexander Bickel or John Hart Ely, sim-
ply do not apply in Islamic constitutional contexts in which the by-product of excluding 
the Fourth Branch is that the judiciary has been made too strong.  See generally 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
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constitutional litigation concerning Islamic law (based on the non-
contradiction clause) and may suggest mechanisms for continuing re-
form if jurists update the law.135  That is, if the government continu-
ously includes jurists in the political process, it heightens the chances 
that legislative acts will meet constitutional requirements of adher-
ence to Islamic legal norms as well as to liberal democratic and hu-
man rights norms. 
Iraq’s recent experiences with Resolution 137 already parallel the 
element of popular involvement in Morocco’s pre-reform process, 
which eventually elicited a governmental response to both popular 
and juristic concerns.  Inasmuch as the Moroccan reforms reflect 
more mature developments in the line of popular and juristic in-
volvement in legal interpretation and articulation, it is useful to take 
a closer look at the Moroccan political process and the substance of 
its reforms. 
IV.  ALL THE KING’S MEN:  GOVERNMENT AND JURISTS IN MOROCCAN 
REFORMS 
Morocco recently passed sweeping reforms to its existing personal 
status laws136 through a process that self-consciously sought to harmo-
nize democratic and human rights norms with Islamic legal norms.137  
 
135 There is of course the argument that juristic legal updating has stagnated, and this is part 
of the problem with Islamic law in the modern age.  See, e.g., HALLAQ, supra note 6, at 21.  
As Hallaq points out, such stagnation is a symptom of recent historical contingencies, 
rather than an element intrinsic to Islamic law.  As discussed below, in the Moroccan 
case, it does not take into account new pressures for updating Islamic law within the 
changing face of the Muslim world, in terms of literacy, geo-politics, and popular agita-
tion for reform. 
136 The pre-existing code of personal status was issued in 1956 following independence from 
France.  Mudawwanat al-aḥwāl al-shakhṣiyya [Personal Status Code] (1956); see ISLAMIC 
FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD:  A GLOBAL RESEOURCE BOOK 179 (Abdullahi An-
Na’im ed., 2002) [hereinafter ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW RESOURCE BOOK].  Before that, un-
codified, informal Islamic law and customary law governed family law.  That law was based 
on mainstream settled Mālikī substantive rules and incorporated some provisions from 
other schools along with legislation from neighboring countries. 
137 Mudawwanat al-usra [Family Code] pmbl. para. 4 (2004) (Morocco), available at the Official 
Website of the Moroccan Justice Department, http://www.justice.gov.ma, English transla-
tion (unofficial), available at http://friendsofmorocco.org/Family%20Code.htm (last 
viewed Dec. 25, 2006) (noting that King Muḥammad VI directed the Royal Commission 
to give attention to the dictates of Islamic law as well as internationally recognized human 
rights).  Despite the King’s assertion that the Code was written all “in accordance with 
certain provisions of the Mālikī School,” id. pmbl, it, too, draws on other schools.  For ex-
ample, its provisions have no guardian requirement for a woman entering into a first-time 
marriage, in accordance with Ḥanafī and Shī‛ī law, and inserts the requirement from Shī‛ī 
law of witnesses to perfect a divorce; neither of these are mainstream Mālikī positions.  
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The new Moroccan Family Code,138 like the old, centers on settled 
rules of Mālikī law, but it includes non-Mālikī provisions and was 
drafted—according to the King—with a purposive approach designed 
to underscore values of equality, tolerance, and fairness.139  The re-
sulting Code contains several substantive changes140 for which wom-
en’s groups, international NGOs, and others have praised it as an ex-
ample of “progressive” personal status laws within an Islamic 
framework.141 
Whether Morocco’s Code is indeed “progressive,” by whatever 
standard one would measure the term, is not the central point of this 
discussion concerning Islamic constitutionalism.  We can assume 
some satisfaction amongst Moroccans with the mostly positive domes-
tic response. 
 
This is confirmed by Aboubakr Jamai, Moroccan journalist and editor, who interviewed 
some of the legislators and jurists who sat on the reform commission.  Personal Commu-
nication with Aboubakr Jamai, Publisher, Le Journal Hebdomadaire (Jan. 23, 2006).   
138 Mudawwanat al-usra [Family Code] pmbl. para. 4 (Morocco). 
139 See id. pmbl. paras. 4–5 (stressing the values placed on ijtihād (juridical reasoning)). 
140 The Code reforms several of the most contentious issues for Islamic family law in the 
modern day, the four main areas covering marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheri-
tance.  The changes to marriage and divorce regulations are most extensive.  For exam-
ple, the new Code replaced the minimum marriage age for females (which was fifteen for 
females and eighteen for males) with a minimum age of eighteen for both genders, id. 
art. 19, yet permits the judge to reduce this age in certain justified cases, id. art. 20.  As 
noted, it also does away with the mandatory guardianship requirement entirely.  Id. arts. 
24–25 (“marital tutelage is the woman’s right.”).  It limits polygamy without banning it to-
tally.  Id. pmbl.; id. arts. 40–42.  It disposes of the Mālikī-specific version of a wifely duty to 
obey her husband, replacing it with a scheme of mutual rights and duties between 
spouses.  Id. arts. 26–29, 51, 168, 194–196.  Finally, it places the overall institution of “pri-
vate” marriage and its dissolution within the framework of the state and its legal institu-
tions—requiring divorce to occur within, and be registered by, the courts, id. arts. 78–79, 
124, restricting the man’s typical prerogative under classical Islamic law to initiate di-
vorce, id. arts. 90, 91–93, and granting women new rights of divorce-initiation, id. arts. 89, 
96, 98, 114–115. 
141 Some Moroccan organizations and parties include, among others, L’Association démoc-
ratique des Femmes du Maroc (Moroccan feminist organization), Ḥizb al-‛adl wa al-iḥsān 
(Islamist political party), Jamā‛at al-‛Adl wa al-Iḥsān (Islamist foundation that is the non-
political counterpart to the political party), and Pritemps de l’Égalité (Moroccan human 
rights organization instrumental in bringing about the reforms).  For descriptions of 
many of these groups and their reactions, see Wendy Kristianasen, Islam’s Women Fight for 
Their Rights, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Apr. 2004, http://mondediplo.com/2004/04/
02islamicwomen.  Organizations outside of Morocco include Vital Voices (U.S.-based 
women’s rights group), http://www.vitalvoices.org (last viewed Jan. 3, 2006), and The 
Clinton Foundation, http://www.clintonglobalinitiative.org (last viewed Dec. 24, 2006).  
The Code has been criticized as well.  See, e.g., Jamila Bargach, An Ambiguous Discourse of 
Rights:  The 2004 Family Law Reform in Morocco, 3 HAWWA 245, 261–63 (2005) (criticizing 
the Code’s failure to protect the rights of mothers who have children out of wedlock and 
children who are born out of wedlock). 
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Rather, the contribution that the Moroccan experiment can pro-
vide to considerations of Islamic constitutionalism is to underscore 
the paramount importance of the process by which Islamic legal re-
form was carried out to the broad satisfaction of the people.  The 
unique maneuver here was the King’s establishment of a commission 
to propose legislative reforms, which comprised both jurists and 
Members of Parliament. 
Morocco’s recent history in the area of Islamic family law illumi-
nates how this scheme came about.  In 1992, the Moroccan NGO Un-
ion de l’Action Feminine (UAF) gathered one million signatures 
from men and women in favor of certain reforms in personal status 
laws.142  In 1993, the Parliament amended the law in various ways.143  
But the changes did not go far enough and UAF continued to rally 
governmental and popular support from the King, Parliament Mem-
bers, imams, lawyers, the media, and the Moroccan citizenry at 
large.144  As these debates played out in Parliament and on the streets, 
government reformists argued back and forth with Islamists and ju-
rist-backed opposition over the nature of reforms.  The jurists criti-
cized the government secularists’ proposed project of “Integrating 
Women in Economic Development” because, in their view, the pro-
ject did not relate to Islamic legal norms.145  The jurists viewed the 
project as a threat to the country’s Islamic identity and turned the 
conflict into a debate over the role of Islamic law in legislation.146  As 
is common in debates about the rule of Islamic law, the conflict 
turned into one of identity politics. 
When viewed against the outcome of the recent reforms, clearly, a 
key issue in the debate was whether and what role the jurists would 
play in the reforms.  The disputes over the proposed reforms came to 
a head on the street.  In the spring of 2000, over 300,000 demonstra-
tors supported the secular reform proposal (“Integrating Women in 
Economic Development”) at a rally in Rabat.147  At the same time, a 
comparable number protested the proposal as a deviation from 
 
142 Clinton Global Initiative, Fueling Reform:  Moroccan Family Law as a Model-in-Action 
2005 (Commitment Announcement), http://commitments.clintonglobalinitiative.org/
projects.htm?mode=view&rid=43241 (last viewed Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Fueling Re-
form]. 
143 See ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 136, at 179 (describing the amend-
ments). 
144 Fueling Reform, supra note 142. 
145 Bargach, supra note 141, at 253. 
146 Id. 
147 Hajjar, supra note 60, at 233. 
  
Mar. 2008] ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN IRAQ 575 
 
proper Islamic legal norms.148  In so doing, they demonstrated, for 
the first time, the massive force of the Islamist and juristic elements in 
Morocco and of the legitimizing effect of asserting an Islamic legal 
identity.149  Something had to be done. 
The King intervened, seeking to ameliorate the tensions in a way 
that would attend to the concerns of both the secularists and the 
Islamists.  In April 2001, he halted the purely secular governmental 
reform projects and convened a reform commission with a mandate 
to resolve the secularist-Islamist/juristic differences and propose mu-
tually agreeable reforms for personal status laws.150  He appointed a 
cross section of committee members drawn from groups of men and 
women with expertise that ranged from the political (lobbyists, politi-
cians, and women’s rights activists from the Printemps de l’Égalité 
NGO umbrella group) to the scholarly (including jurists—both men 
and women—who were traditionally trained at the Qarawiyyīn ma-
drasa in Fez).151  Two-and-a-half years later, the Committee finished its 
work.  On October 10, 2003, the King announced the family law re-
form proposal and introduced it to Parliament for consideration.152  
On January 25, 2004, the Moroccan National Assembly adopted the 
bill with minor revisions.153 
Though the Committee did not explicitly disclose their interpre-
tive deliberations, the King’s introductory remarks accompanying the 
Code and certain features of the Code itself suggest particular inter-
pretive methods that the Committee may have employed.  Regardless 
of whether Islamic law was their starting point, the extent to which 
the Commission couched reforms in the language of Islamic law is 
notable.  In large part, the Code reads like a family law chapter from 
a classical law compendium, systematically listing each topic roughly 
in the same order as do classical works of fiqh.  Symbolically, this sig-
nals an attempt to couch the reforms in terms of classical Islamic law 
and to avoid a method of legal reform (common elsewhere in the 
Middle East) that adopts Western templates of law upon which a ve-
 
148 Id. 
149 Bargach, supra note 141, at 253. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 253 n.12 and accompanying text; see also Women’s Learning Partnership for Rights, 
Development, and Peace, Morocco Adopts Landmark Family Law Supporting Women’s 
Equality, Feb. 24, 2004, http://www.learningpartnership.org/en/advocacy/alerts/
morocco0204 (describing the process of adopting the new family law). 
152 Zineb Touimi-Benjelloun, A New Family Law in Morocco:  “Patience Is Bitter, but Its Fruit Is 
Sweet,” UN DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN, Dec. 19, 2003, http://www.unifem.org/gender
_issues/voices_from_the_field/story.php?StoryID=264. 
153 Women’s Learning Partnership for Rights, Development, and Peace, supra note 151. 
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neer of Islamic legal language is placed.154  Instead, the Committee’s 
interpretive strategies center around five approaches that mix classi-
cal Islamic and modern democratic norms:  reinterpreting key 
Qur‘ānic verses and ḥadīth, applying universal legal maxims that re-
flect the spirit of Islamic law,155 adopting minority Mālikī opinions 
along with rules from other legal schools, re-categorizing certain fiqh 
provisions to create new rights and legal remedies for women, and 
overlaying Islamic provisions with state institutional and international 
norms, especially in areas where Islamic law is silent.156 
Although Morocco does not offer an exact parallel to Iraq, it is 
useful in the discussion of actual institutional arrangements under a 
regime of coordinate Islamic constitutionalism.  Morocco differs 
from Iraq in that it is a monarchic democracy rather than a presiden-
tial one; its Muslim population is majority Sunnī with a Shī‛ī minority 
rather than majority Shī‛ī with a Sunnī minority; and it follows the 
Mālikī school of the African-Islamic tradition rather than the Shī‛ī or 
Ḥanafī traditions of Iraq.157  Nevertheless, its experiment is instructive 
for understanding new issues of Islamic constitutionalism inasmuch 
 
154 An example is the Tunisian summary excision of polygamy from its law books.  Note that 
the Committee’s reticence to invalidate polygamy summarily, see supra note 140, does not 
necessarily signal its comfort with the practice.  Rather, they seem to heed the notion that 
following a methodology and speaking in terms of Islamic law provides the best means of 
successful and lasting reform, and thereby may be exportable to countries committed to 
applying some form of Islamic law in the context of Islamic constitutionalism.  According 
to some traditionally trained expert jurists, there are some legal bases for prohibition of 
polygamy outright that have been recently advanced, but the arguments in favor of that 
position have yet to gain traction in the grammar of Islamic law. 
155 For instance, in expanding women’s options to initiate divorce on the ground of harm 
inflicted by her spouse, it “endorse[s] the general legal principle [that a legal agent 
should] ‘neither harm nor be harmed’ to promote equality and equity between the two 
spouses.”  Mudawwanat al-usra [Family Code] pmbl. (2004) (Morocco); id. art. 89.  The 
quoted language is one of five universal Islamic legal maxims.  Another example is the 
Code’s changes to certain marriage guidelines for residents abroad to facilitate recogni-
tion of those marriages in Moroccan courts.  Id.  This is based on the maxim that “hard-
ship brings about facilitation.”  For a discussion of these and other Islamic universal legal 
maxims, see generally Wolfhart Heinrichs, Qawā’id as a Genre of Legal Literature, in STUDIES 
IN ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY 365 (Bernard G. Weiss ed., 2002). 
156 The Code distinguishes between principles derived from Islamic law (by use of the term 
shar‛ī) from principles that issue from state law (by use of the term qānūnī) in order to 
clarify areas where the basis of the law is secular (i.e., fact-based or contingent and there-
fore not within the full jurisdiction of Islamic law) and thereby justify arbitrary stipula-
tions.  For example, it uses the “state” age of legal majority to set the age of majority at 
eighteen for both genders.  Mudawwanat al-usra [Family Code] art. 19. (Morocco). 
157 One objection to the view of Morocco as a model is that the charismatic monarch there 
makes all the difference in driving legal change.  Yet this feature of the Moroccan system 
is one means that the different branches are forced to coordinate; arguably it is not the 
only means. 
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as it offers insight into the workings of a coordinate model of consti-
tutionalization that has been acclaimed a success both domestically 
and internationally. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Islamic law is a complex legal system, and its incorporation into 
modern state structures demands a unique institutional arrangement 
for interpreting the law.  Once a constitution has declared Islamic law 
to be a source of legislation or enshrines an Islamic law non-
contradiction clause, political leaders and other interested actors de-
termine how legal processes will play out.  Central issues include the 
scope of consideration afforded Islamic law in the constitutional in-
corporation, the nature and substance of the law in the context of Is-
lamic constitutionalism, and the governmental decision-makers in the 
realm of legislation and adjudication vis-à-vis the jurists who typically 
are popularly recognized as the historically competent interpreters of 
Islamic law. 
A useful analysis of Islamic constitutionalism moves beyond the 
question of whether Islam and democracy are compatible, or whether 
Islamic law is compatible with democratic notions concerning the 
rule of law.  Theoretical proposals and historical trends suggest that 
they are, and for three reasons, pragmatic concerns require modes of 
discussing how they are.  First, Islamic constitutionalism inevitably 
contemplates some role for the jurists, as historically they have en-
joyed the epistemic authority and training that grants them legiti-
macy and competence to interpret Islamic law or approve Islamic le-
gal interpretations.  The Constitution brings the positivist rule of 
recognition to bear in full force with reference to Islamic legal 
norms.  Second, jurists are individual or corporate members of a de-
mocratic polity whose voices play a role in democratic participation.  
In some sense, they too form a part of “We the People,” inasmuch as 
their corporate members appeal to them and defer to their decisions.  
Finally, the juristic class is often a central component to Islamic law 
and practice, and to legal reform as well perhaps, because of a signifi-
cant amount of popular legitimacy.  Jurists themselves often assert a 
right to play a role in, or at least monitor, Islamic legal interpretation 
that, with their popular support, it has been politically difficult for 
governments to deny. All these factors indicate that jurists comprise a 
type of Fourth Branch to an Islamic constitutional government; that 
is, their very presence coupled with a constitutional clause incorpo-
rating Islamic law demands the constitutionally constructed three 
branches to negotiate a certain relationship with them.  This relation-
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ship ranges from exclusion to dominance, and in its best iterations, it 
is coordinate.  In short, it is an unavoidable conclusion that by the 
terms of Islamic constitutional clauses and related political theories, 
jurists matter for law and governance in Islamic constitutional re-
gimes like Iraq.  With this in mind, contemplating Islamic constitu-
tionalism requires attention to the jurists and their interpretive me-
thods. 
In addition, recent history suggests at least two ways in which the 
exclusion of jurists may be harmful.  First, exclusion typically brings 
about opposition that tends to foment fundamentalism in the name 
of a return to Islamic legitimacy.  Here, identity politics may prolifer-
ate in the form of suppressed sentiments amongst a population 
quelled by a strong government and weak democratic institutions 
that fail to protect individual rights; it may create violent unrest.  Or, 
if fundamentalist proponents of Islamic law manage to gain power, it 
may emerge in the form of Islamic law that is imposed from the top 
down, without any power-sharing or checks and balances at all.  This 
latter scenario describes countries where there is formal constitution-
alization of Islamic law but weak democratic structures. 
Second, exclusion actually may prevent political and judicial re-
form.  This possibility describes countries where there is either in-
formal or coordinate constitutionalization of Islamic law, but where 
judges who have no Islamic law expertise have been empowered to 
interpret the law without adequate interpretive tools for doing so.  In 
such cases, they tend to crystalize the law without attempting juris-
prudential methods to reform it, and exclude the jurists equipped to 
do so (if they are so inclined—which is, admittedly, quite another 
question.)  In other words, judges, if not the institutional arrange-
ment itself, bind their own hands.  In such situations, the state has 
constitutionalized Islamic law, but the institutional arrangement has 
removed legitimate methods for its dynamic growth or reform by ex-
cluding Islamic law experts from the interpretive project.  To pre-
serve a strong executive and an independent judiciary, judges, politi-
cians, and the executive alike in such systems support this 
arrangement and thereby squeeze out popular calls for change.  In 
short, the judicialization of Islamic law without professional juristic 
expertise prevents, rather than encourages, legal reform on Islamic 
grounds. 
For democratic and rights interests, the best outcomes in Islamic 
constitutionalism seem to emerge when the government acknowl-
edges the presence of the jurists and sets up an institutional ar-
rangement whereby it works with them in a coordinate fashion.  Do-
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ing so places control over law in the democratic sovereign, complete 
with checks and balances, and encourages the popular sentiments of 
“We the People” to balance against the expertise of “We the Jurists.”  
While it has several differences from the Iraqi situation, Morocco and 
its recent family law reforms at least can be seen as an example of this 
trend.  Each Islamic constitutional country will be different in the way 
that it negotiates this task along with the differences in the religio-
political and demographic makeup, transnational influences, juristic 
interpretive methods, and institutional legacy that its jurists and citi-
zenry bring to the table.  Iraq—with its mixed Sunnī–Shī‛ī and non-
Muslim population, together with its majority Shī‛ī jurists’ sturdy in-
stitutional presence and their strong living tradition of Islamic legal 
interpretation—will have to work out its own answers to Islamic con-
stitutionalism’s four questions raised in this Article.  As it does so, 
Iraq will no doubt carefully consider, in coordination with the juristic 
Fourth Branch, the institutional arrangement and the interpretive 
mandate for its government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
